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ABSTRACT

THE BOSTON BLACK UNITED FRONT AND COMMUNITY-CENTERED
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CARCERAL STATE

August 2021
Joseph W. Sikowitz, B.S., University of Maryland
M.L.S., University of Maryland
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston
Directed by Assistant Professor Nicholas Juravich
This thesis is a history of the Boston Black United Front’s (BBUF) activities
combatting the growing carceral state in Massachusetts in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The BBUF was an “umbrella” organization within Boston’s Black community during the
Black Power era and was particularly active on issues of police shootings, court
appointments, prison reform, and street crime. This thesis examines these aspects of the
carceral state, the network of criminal justice institutions that arose following World War II
in Boston, and shows that the BBUF were responding to the early stages of this trend.
Committees, rallies, and ideology were early methods utilized by the BBUF to unite their
community. These tactics were later built upon as the group mounted an opposition to the
carceral state and presented community-centered alternatives to punitive solutions to poverty.
iv

Specific rallying points for the BBUF were four police shootings of unarmed Black men,
judicial appointments, prison reform, and BBUF street patrols in the South End, Roxbury,
Dorchester, and Mattapan neighborhoods. In the end, the BBUF saw some success, but failed
to prevent the carceral state’s growth. Their history, however, dispels many long-held
assumptions about Black communities and the carceral state and adds a unique perspective to
the history of Boston.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The confluence of urban renewal, economic decline, demographic change, and racism
in Boston led to an increasing reliance on punitive solutions for the problems of poverty in
the 1960s and 1970s. Black Bostonians bore the brunt of this carceral transformation, and
continue to do so today. Finding little relief in established white institutions at the beginning
of this carceral turn, the Boston Black United Front (BBUF) organized a years-long,
community-based response. This thesis examines that response and reveals that Boston’s
Black population were significantly impacted by the growing carceral state.
As an idea, the BBUF emerged after Stokely Carmichael’s December 1967 speech at
the Roxbury YMCA, in which he urged Black communities across America to form united
fronts in their communities to counter the coming backlash against the civil rights
movement.1 Many local organizers who had participated in previous social movements in
Boston began meeting shortly after Carmichael’s speech to discuss his concept, but it
remained largely that—a concept—until the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in
April 1968. As in many Black communities across America, Dr. King’s killing jolted
Boston’s Black activists to organize in the fashion Carmichael had advocated. Their efforts
found a ready willingness among even the more traditional elements of the community to

1

Chuck Turner, interview by Carly Caroli, March 2016, Boston, MA.

1

coordinate on self-defense, policing, economic development, education, housing, and
politics.2 The BBUF was created as a result. A self-described “umbrella organization” of
individuals and organizations, the BBUF was formed by activists and everyday residents who
found common cause through the BBUF’s work despite ideological divisions.3
While Carmichael’s speech and Dr. King’s assassination galvanized the formation of
the BBUF, national figures and events should not obscure the vibrancy that already existed
among Boston’s Black activists in the 1960s. School reform had already spurred a great deal
of action, including the “Stay Out for Freedom” protests of 1963, which saw thousands of
students temporarily refuse to attend classes to draw attention to the abysmal condition of the
public schools that Black students attended. Housing was likewise an issue that saw a great
deal of Black activism throughout the 1960s with groups like the Community Assembly for a
United South End (CAUSE) pressuring the city and construction companies for more equity
in urban development.4 On the economic front, 1963 saw activists organizing boycotts of
businesses that were known to discriminate against African Americans. These actions
delivered concrete gains in some cases—job offers to members of the Black community—
and raised general awareness of the obstacles that Black Bostonians faced.
Protests for economic justice coincided with police brutality in what became known
in the Black community as the Police Riots during the summer of 1967. The impetus for
these violent confrontations were demonstrations by Mothers for Adequate Welfare (MAW).

2

Mel King, Chain of Change (Boston: South End Press, 1981): 101-110.
“Statement of Purpose,” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, n.d. SC1, Box 1. Roxbury Community
College Library Special Collections.
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Having agitated peacefully since 1965 for welfare reform, MAW began a nonviolent sit-in at
the Welfare Department in Roxbury. On the second day of protests, however, things took a
violent turn. Demonstrators were attacked by police attempting to break up the gathering.
This violence then spilled over into looting and arson in the commercial areas of Blue Hill
Avenue.5 Chuck Turner, later a co-chairman of the BBUF, was deeply involved in organizing
MAW.6 The violent response of police to peaceful demands for social and economic justice
would inform his and other members of the BBUF’s views as they confronted similar
iniquities in coming years. As both MAW actions and Turner’s involvement show, the
formation of the BBUF did not happen sui generis. Instead, the organization’s founding was
the culmination of national and local events, and the next phase of a robust activist
community already at work in Boston.
As this thesis examines the BBUF’s actions, impact, and legacy, six key insights
emerge. One is that both the carceral state and street crime were concerns for Boston’s Black
community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Historians have often posited that these two
trends were mutually exclusive or that the latter caused the former. The history of the BBUF
shows that it was possible to be concerned with both. BBUF leadership saw the
interrelationship between the two, but did not assume more policing and prisons would solve
crimes driven by poverty. This awareness among BBUF activists also demonstrates the Black
community’s historical agency on matters of criminal justice, another area sorely missing in
much of the literature.

Jim Vrabel, A People’s History of the New Boston, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014): 8191.
6
King, Chain, 57-9.
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A second insight that this thesis reveals is the degree of community cohesion present
among members of Boston’s Black community during the BBUF era. Several decades of
community activism and shared lived experiences led them to find common cause against the
burgeoning carceral state. Without cohesion from these historical elements, an organization
would have struggled to be effective. The degree of community cohesion exhibited also
speaks to the ongoing and long-term effects of racist policing and punitive policies against a
targeted segment of the population. Living in a community under threat of violence from
those who were in charge of safety had a powerful effect on group identity and self-reliance.
Third is the inextricable relationship between racism and economics, and the ways
this connection affects policing, incarceration, and crime. Boston’s Black community was
targeted for control through the carceral state more than other communities because of a
history of racist economic exclusion. A vicious cycle of racism and impoverishment fed on
itself, and in the late 1960s a punitive solution to this poverty replaced the state’s former
focus on welfare.
A fourth insight uncovered by this thesis is the degree to which the BBUF’s mediabased activities prefigured much of the online activism of today. The BBUF were savvy
users of newspapers, rallies, posters, and other forms of communication that mirrored ways
racial justice activists use today’s media landscape. The BBUF’s tactics in this area, like
those of individuals and organizations working on similar issues today, raise important
questions about the ethical limits of using various media for a cause. For one, do
marginalized groups have a right to communicate messages not sanctioned by mainstream
power brokers? If so, how far can they take their alternative views? Even if one agrees with a
4

group’s overall challenge to the status quo, the means by which that challenge is put forth
may not be considered ethical by all.
Fifth, this thesis shows the degree to which the BBUF was willing to pursue different
avenues simultaneously to affect change. Often, the group attempted to work with city and
state power holders while at the same time attempting to deal with issues of policing, courts,
prisons, and crime themselves. Many Black Power groups of the time were seen as hostile to
authority, whereas the BBUF was not. The BBUF did not neatly fit into the Black Power
movement, even though it was formed during the Black Power era and adopted much of its
rhetoric.
A sixth and final insight apparent in this thesis is that the BBUF understood the
systemic nature of the carceral state. BBUF leaders made connections between economics,
crime, racism, policing, urban renewal, incarceration, government, and community. These
are interrelated facets of the carceral state that many scholars and much of the public did not
understand until recently. For BBUF activists, reform of one of these components of the
carceral state alone would not yield a new relationship with the state for Black Bostonians.
Rather, comprehensive changes were needed. The BBUF offered a community-centered
alternative model as a potential replacement for the carceral state. Ultimately, as compelling
as the BBUF vision was for many Black Bostonians, it failed to prevent mass incarceration,
police brutality, and other manifestations of the carceral state. Their failure demonstrates the
limitations of community-based actions against systemic social problems.
After a year in which Black Lives Matter (BLM) protesters marched on state houses
across the nation, the legacy of the BBUF and its efforts to radically reform the criminal
5

justice system have never been more relevant. Just as the BBUF marched, issued demands to
city officials, investigated police brutality, and took criminal justice into their own hands in a
variety of ways, today’s BLM activists are similarly challenging the foundations of the
carceral state by demanding police, prison, and social reform.
At the same time, significant differences of scale, urban racial diversity, and legacies
of Black activism separate the BBUF and BLM challenges to the carceral state. When the
BBUF began its attempts to find justice for Black Bostonians in the late 1960s, the carceral
state was in its infancy, with mass incarceration rates and federal spending on policing just
beginning to grow. In contrast, BLM activists are now seeking to reform or abolish a system
that has had fifty years to mature and now employs hundreds of thousands, imprisons
millions, and has supporters across the political spectrum and throughout legislatures across
the nation.7 Cities today are also more diverse than they were during the earlier period and so
racial justice protesters and activists come from more diverse backgrounds.
While these differences are significant, they do not detract from the historical
importance of understanding the successes and failures of the BBUF. Balancing cooperation
and resistance with the carceral state, use of various media to promote movements for justice,
and uniting local communities behind a cause are all as relevant today as they were then.
Indeed, the legacy of the BBUF is only becoming more important in the third decade of the
twenty-first century and therefore it demands a robust historical accounting.

Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020,” Prison Policy Initiative, Press
Release, March 24, 2020. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.
7
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The second chapter of this thesis explores the historical context of the BBUF and puts
an emerging historical literature on the origins of the carceral state in conversation with
urban histories of Boston. Economic decline, urban renewal, the Second Great Migration,
and racism are explored as the forces that led to the growth of Boston’s carceral state. Social
movements within Boston’s African American community are also examined as a source of
historical precedent for the BBUF. Finally, the second chapter connects the African
American history of Boston to the BBUF’s rhetorical and operational responses to the
carceral state. The third chapter explores BBUF concepts, organizing tactics, ideology, and
rallies that incorporated the rhetoric and operations discussed in chapter two. The fourth
chapter examines BBUF actions on police shootings, court reform, prison reform, and
community security, connecting the historical context of chapter two with the actions and
rhetoric of chapter three. In chapter five, the conclusion, the thesis draws together all of the
elements from preceding chapters to offer insights into the historical relevance of the
BBUF’s struggle with the carceral state.

7

CHAPTER 2
THE GROWTH OF THE CARCERAL STATE IN MASSACHUSETTS

After World War II, urban areas across the United States saw changes in the
relationships between Black communities and the collection of criminal justice institutions
known as the carceral state. Restructuring of capital, urban renewal projects, the Second
Great Migration, and racism all shaped an urban landscape in which the state increasingly
looked to punitive solutions for the problems associated with poverty. Over the past decade,
historians have analyzed how today’s carceral state took shape both in national policies and
particular cities, like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago.
In Boston, where the Black community accounted for less than ten percent of the
population prior to the 1960s, capital restructuring and urban renewal did not initially target
Black Bostonians to the degree they did in other cities. However, as Boston’s Black
population doubled and thousands of white Bostonians left the city over the course of that
decade, the effects of the carceral state grew. Incidents of police brutality, unfair sentencing
in the courts, a growing prison population, and declining safety in Black neighborhoods were
becoming a regular part of life in the South End, Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan.
While Boston had a long history of Black activism prior to the late 1960s, no
organization directly or systematically addressed the effects of the carceral state in the Black
community until the BBUF was formed in 1968. Perceiving the interrelated nature of urban
decline, the criminal justice system, and racism, the BBUF protested, sought reforms where
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possible, developed rhetoric rooted in Black Power, and served as a surrogate local
government when the city of Boston failed to justly serve its Black residents.
The historical context in which the BBUF arose was shaped by the societal changes
that took place in the 1950s and 1960s. In response to these changes, policymakers and
politicians began to rely on policing and incarceration rather than social supports for the most
vulnerable citizens. In this context, the BBUF’s criminal justice work shows that a lack of
jobs, education, housing, and healthcare for Boston’s Black community were the drivers of
poverty and crime, and that a punitive solution would not solve the underlying issues. The
organizational capacities of the BBUF were developed with these concerns in mind and
unleashed in response to over-policing, declining safety, and increasing entanglements for
Black Bostonians with Massachusetts’ carceral apparatus.
Evidence of the effects of the carceral trend on Boston’s Black community is
nowhere more apparent than in the rates of incarceration for various racial groups in
Massachusetts. While contact with police officers is the likeliest point in the carceral system
for violence, prisons are the point at which the failures of the justice system to protect all
citizens truly come to light. By the end of the 1970s, Massachusetts was imprisoning African
Americans at approximately six times the rate of whites, a ratio that remains intact today.8
There were increases in this ratio during the 1980s and 1990s, but the overall point is that
Black citizens in Massachusetts were and are imprisoned in vastly disproportionate numbers
compared to white residents.
Another indicator of the power of the carceral state in Boston is the budget of the
Boston Police Department (BPD) compared to other city departments. The force’s fiscal year

“Incarceration Trends in Massachusetts,” Vera Institute of Justice, December 2019,
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-massachusetts.pdf.
8
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2020-2021 budget was $414,182,025. That amount is ten times larger than the library budget,
fifteen times larger than the budget for neighborhood development and one-hundred eightytwo times larger than the budget for the arts.9 Today’s carceral conditions began in the urban
changes that occurred in the postwar period and led to a punitive shift in the state. The
BBUF’s anti-carceral state activities were the Black community’s early answer.
Economic Decline in Boston, 1945-1980
Boston, like other urban areas of New England, experienced an industrial and
economic decline during the Great Depression and that continued apace following World
War II. Key industries like leather and footwear moved out of the region while shipyards
closed. The end of the war economy also had an impact, with the cancellation of war
contracts and the ensuing decline in the machinery and tooling industries. Within the city
limits of Boston, the overall decline was exacerbated by the movement of capital and jobs
from the inner city to the suburbs. The burgeoning electronics industry, in particular, grew
along the Route 128 corridor rather than in the heart of the city.10 This sent the city into a
spiral where city income declined while taxes were raised, further incentivizing businesses to
leave for cheaper locations.
By the early 1950s, many white Bostonians were abandoning the inner city for the
jobs and housing that were available in the suburbs, leaving city structures to deteriorate.11
Boston's economic situation affected working-class communities across the city, but by the
1960s, continuing economic restructuring and suburbanization disproportionately touched

Lauren Chambers, “Unpacking the Boston Police Budget,” American Civil Liberties Union Massachusetts,
https://data.aclum.org/2020/06/05/unpacking-the-boston-police-budget/.
10
Thomas H. O’Connor, Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950-1970 (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1993), 19.
11
O’Connor, 72-3.
9
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Black residents. Populating a significant portion of the low-wage sector of the workforce,
they were particularly subject to changes in the prevailing economic winds.12
Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s analysis of postwar California in Golden Gulag provides a
useful framework for understanding the impact these economic changes had on Boston and
the carceral turn that most affected its Black citizens. While the two economies had
similarities and differences, the effects of the changes fueled a carceral approach to poverty
in both cases. Crucial to Gilmore’s theoretical framework is what the author outlines as the
shift from the Keynesian welfare state to a much less forgiving form of capitalism. This
change is described as one from the “welfare-warfare” state to the “workfare-warfare” state,
where, as care for the most vulnerable members of society devolved from federal to state
governments, the latter turned toward policing and incarceration as the remedy for the
declining economic prospects under the post-Keynesian economic outlook.13
Boston, like parts of California, saw war industry contracts dry up in the 1950s, and
with them, industrial jobs. The movement of business and middle-class taxpayers in Boston
from the inner city to the suburbs likewise mirrored the disruptive effects that capital had in
California. By the late 1960s, the retreat of the federal government’s welfare initiatives
devolved responsibility for the most vulnerable to Massachusetts and Boston. For the city,
the solution for these problems became growing the carceral state.14
Gilmore’s work helped launch the carceral perspective in historical studies from
which this thesis draws its analytical framing. Other scholars have built on this foundation to

Anne Gray Fischer, “’The Place is Gone!’: Policing Black Women to Redevelop Downtown Boston,”
Journal of Social History 53, no. 1 (2019): 11.
13
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California
(California: University of California Press, 2007), 30-86.
14
On the defense industry and suburbanization in Boston see O’Connor; on the decline of welfare in Boston see
Fischer; on the lack of economic opportunity for Black Bostonians see Mel King.
12
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add more complexity to the framework. John Clegg and Adaner Usmani argue against
overemphasizing race in the causes of mass incarceration in favor of economics. In
developing this argument, the authors first point to a statistical jump in violent crime in the
1960s. Clegg and Usmani then draw attention to the weakness of the American working-class
as a political bloc, arguing that as a result necessary resources were not adequately
redistributed from the top of the economic hierarchy to the bottom, provoking local
authorities into taking a punitive approach to a rise in crime in poor communities. Thus, the
turn toward punishment, rather than social reform, was the result of economic forces and the
weakness of the American welfare state. To bolster their argument, Clegg and Usmani draw
from economics, education, and public opinion statistics to demonstrate these historical
trends.15
In a rebuttal called “Materializing Race: On Capitalism and Mass Incarceration,” Jack
Norton and David Stein argue that Clegg and Usmani overemphasized and oversimplified the
connections between a hypothetically stronger United States welfare state and a smaller
carceral state. Norton and Stein do not disagree that unfettered capitalism has contributed to
the rapid growth of mass incarceration in the United States, but argue that race is integral to
understanding class and economics. It cannot be disaggregated and posited as a secondary
cause. Crime, too, in Norton and Stein’s refutation is integrated with economics and race, and
should not to be dismissed or overemphasized in any analysis.16 The authors of
“Materializing Race” argue for an intersectional analysis of the carceral state that
incorporates race, class, and other aspects of society rather than the distillation of a particular

John Clegg and Adaner Usmani, “The Economic Origins of Mass Incarceration,” Catalyst 3, no. 3 (Fall
2019), https://catalyst-journal.com/vol3/no3/the-economic-origins-of-mass-incarceration.
16
Jack Norton and David Stein, “Materializing Race: On Capitalism and Mass Incarceration,” Spectre 1, no. 2
(Fall 2020), https://spectrejournal.com/issues-index/.
15
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component of society like economics alone. This is not so much a complete refutation of
Clegg and Usmani’s view as a case for a richer, more complex analysis of the carceral state.
Unlike Clegg and Usmani or Norton and Stein, Elizabeth Hinton’s book, From the
War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America, traces
the history of mass incarceration to the political environment born of the Great Society. In
Hinton’s assessment, mass incarceration was, perversely, the byproduct of the growth of the
welfare state and a reaction to the civil rights movement. The same progressive reformers
who sought to end racial discrimination and poverty also tied crime prevention into their
program. Major aspects of this shift, according to Hinton, were the growth of “scientific”
approaches to criminal behavior and increased funding from the federal government. These
approaches were ultimately flawed to begin with as they overemphasized crime in African
American neighborhoods, further reinforcing the surveillance, detention, segregation, and
impoverishment of Black citizens.17 Hinton’s analysis recognizes the significant role the
federal government played in the early days of the carceral state in a manner that differs from
Gilmore. The War on Poverty and ensuing federal policies certainly played a role in shaping
policing in the 1960s and 1970s, but, like economics, do not entirely explain the changes that
occurred. Rather, the federal government helped shape capital’s shift away from inner cities,
and the increased support for policing was a byproduct of the earlier swing away from
Keynesianism.
Economic decline in Boston in the postwar period and its disproportionate effects on
African Americans defines part of the historical landscape of the BBUF. Poverty was a
concern for the organization, but the response by the state to the effects of poverty was even

17

Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in
America, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016).
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more important. As increased policing and incarceration were favored as methods to control
the poor, the BBUF connected the injustices of poverty and this type of state intervention. At
the same time, the BBUF also sought to combat the increased crime within the Black
community that resulted from a lack of economic opportunity. Economics acted together
with urban renewal, demographic change, and racism, but was not far from the minds of the
BBUF leadership as they confronted the issues presented by the carceral state.
Urban Renewal in Boston, 1950-1970s
In his inaugural speech as mayor on January 2, 1950, John Hynes promised to create
a “New Boston.” His plan, in part, would utilize slum clearance with the aid of federal
funding. Hynes’ tenure kicked off a new era in which the machine politics of Mayor James
Michael Curley gave way to a business-friendly administration. The physical transformation
of the city promised economic revitalization to the bankers and business leaders that Hynes
courted.
Intertwined with the business interests now dominating City Hall in the 1950s was the
designation of “blight” given to particular areas of the city by local banks. This policy,
known as redlining, caused significant political and economic damage to these
neighborhoods. Redlining, as historians define it today, began in the 1930s when the Home
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) commissioned local real estate boards to produce colorcoded maps of cities to determine their desirability for investment. Systemic disinvestment,
beginning in the 1930s, eventually rendered whole neighborhoods fit for the wrecking ball, a
process of state-sponsored redevelopment that opened them to private capital.
Dominated by white men, Boston’s banks considered the areas with the greatest
numbers of Black residents like the South End, Dorchester, and Roxbury to be the most

14

blighted. But Black neighborhoods were considered blighted only because they did not have
the businesses or upper-class populations that banks wanted in order to justify investment.
This then became a self-fulfilling prophecy in which middle class people moved outside of
the city for lower mortgage rates and jobs, further impoverishing those neighborhoods that
actually needed investment the most. City services suffered, as well, which left garbage on
the streets and led infrastructure to decline. Even downtown Boston by the 1950s was
considered a blighted area by many of these banks.
Slum clearance and the remaking of “blighted” areas would provide an opening for
business investment in Boston, but at a cost to the most marginalized residents in the city.
The West End and New York Streets areas were two sections of Boston that saw radical
redevelopment as part of this process.18 The former was a mostly white area and the latter
more racially mixed. Urban renewal in Boston demonstrated an indifference and hostility to
working class communities as their neighborhoods were selected to be cleared and rebuilt.
Boston’s small, tight-knit Black community avoided the comprehensive
neighborhood clearance that residents faced in the mostly white West End. Nonetheless, by
the 1960s, Black Bostonians were increasingly feeling the effects of urban renewal. As their
population in Boston doubled over the course of a mere decade, it did so in a city that had
eliminated thousands of units of housing for working-class residents. In Roxbury, the heart of
the Black community, clearance projects had begun for two highways, the Inner Belt and the
Southwest Expressway.19 Neither one was ultimately built, in part, because of a coalition of
activists that included the BBUF. Boston’s integrated South End was spared total clearance,

O’Connor, Building, 39-224.
Karilyn Crockett, People Before Highways: Boston Activists, Urban Planners, and a New Movement for City
Making (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2018), 164-95.
18

19
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however, redevelopment projects there still brought struggles for Black community leaders to
rally against, including BBUF stalwart Mel King. Leaders like King demanded communitycontrolled affordable housing rather than the middle-income redevelopment that targeted the
white professional class.20
By the 1960s, despite the Black community’s efforts, redevelopment in Boston
shifted from slum clearance to subsidizing and encouraging private investment, driving the
newly diagnosed problem of gentrification. This process replaced Black South Enders with
an influx of white newcomers. Many longtime residents of that neighborhood were forced to
move into more cramped and less desirable parts of Roxbury.21 At the same time, the
professionals who gentrified formerly Black neighborhoods demanded an increased police
presence in the name of safety. In this way, displacement was the first step, followed by more
policing.
Another effect of urban renewal was to empower white enclaves, often at the expense
of Black residents. The urban renewal that also affected white ethnic neighborhoods in
Boston led residents of those neighborhoods to organize politically and for their own
interests. This shifted divisions within city politics from ones of religion and ethnicity to
those of race and class. The declining support from the federal government for welfare
programs (beginning in the late 1960s) exacerbated this situation, putting white and Black
groups at odds over state and city services.22
Increased policing and incarceration were then grafted onto this already volatile
situation. As Gilmore observes, by the late 1960s, the decline in federal support for inner city

Vrabel, People’s History, 101-11.
Vrabel, 110.
22
O’Connor, Building, 290-6 and King, Chain, 64-78.
20
21
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populations left states and municipalities to deal with the problems of poverty. Business
interests, too, wanted slum clearance, an end to blight, and the perception that their newly
renewed neighborhoods would not have the type of people that would make them undesirable
to professionals and other moneyed buyers.
Anne Gray Fischer in “’The Place is Gone!’” illuminates the causal relationship
between the over-policing of Black Bostonians—particularly Black women—and the midcentury urban renewal project. The author’s work demonstrates that African Americans in
downtown Boston’s red-light district, colloquially known as the Combat Zone—an area that
emerged when the “old” red light district, Scollay Square, was cleared for urban renewal—
were disproportionately targeted by the police in order to make the area more amenable to
white capital interests that were developing the area.23 The connections made by Fischer
between capital, urban renewal, policing, and racism demonstrate that these were all
interrelated forces that converged on Boston’s African Americans more than other groups.
While the author’s focus is on Black women in particular, the BBUF’s activism around
police shootings, courts, prisons, and neighborhood safety supplement what Fischer found to
be an increasing part of the Black experience in Boston in the 1960s and 1970s.
Arnold Hirsch’s Making the Second Ghetto analyzes the effects of urban renewal on
postwar Chicago, but nonetheless points out similar dynamics to those that were occurring in
Boston. White flight to the suburbs, an expansion of Chicago’s Black population, and urban
renewal both expanded and further impoverished the “ghetto,” the segregated section of
Chicago where the city’s Black population lived. Urban economic decline was met with
reactions from both business interests and lower-class white populations. The former drove

23

Fischer, “Place,” 20.

17

urban redevelopment projects to clear slums and invest capital while the latter group rioted
and attacked Black Chicagoans over and over again from the 1940s to the 1960s. In Hirsch’s
telling, “the process of reconstruction, which saw blacks treated as objects rather than as
participants, revealed their powerlessness.”24
So too were Boston’s Black residents marginalized by economic decline followed by
redevelopment along racial lines. Most famously, these tensions erupted into the anti-busing
movement in 1970s Boston, but historians have made connections between the earlier
changes wrought by urban renewal and the later fight to protect white neighborhoods.25 To
working-class white Bostonians, economic restructuring had only benefited elites and urban
renewal had robbed them of their neighborhoods. The racism and interethnic friction that led
white Bostonians to violently reject busing—itself driven by economic decline and urban
renewal—likewise contributed to the escalating role the carceral state played in the lives of
Boston’s Black community.
The Second Great Migration and Urban Change in Boston, 1960s
Over the course of the 1960s Boston underwent drastic demographic changes. Much
of that change came from those who left the South as part of the Second Great Migration.
Still underway in the 1960s, this growth in Boston’s Black population, combined with
economic decline, urban renewal, and racism, made their community a more significant
target for increased policing and incarceration. In a 1961 report published by the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of the Census, African Americans only comprised 9.06
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percent of the population of Boston.26 By 1971, African Americans’ share of the city’s
population had grown to 18.15 percent.27 Coupled with this increase was a decline in the
city’s overall white population from 90.2 percent to 81.8 percent.28 These local trends—
growing African American populations and declining white ones—were indicative of larger
national trends for urban areas. Many African Americans moved to northern cities from the
South for jobs and greater freedom, while white urban residents fled to the suburbs in what
was deemed “white flight.”29 Boston was no different and these major population shifts
would contribute to the shape of activism in the 1960s and 1970s.
From one perspective, Black citizens’ control at the municipal level due to the rapid
growth of their population and the decline of Boston’s white population could have provided
a larger bloc upon which political and economic power could be built. Boston had seen such
enlargements in power by ethnic groups in earlier eras, most notably by the Irish during the
reign of Mayor James Michael Curley.30 If progress for certain ethnic groups was built upon
taking control of City Hall, many in the 1960s thought perhaps it was African Americans’
turn. From another perspective, Boston’s demographic shift in the 1960s was relatively small
compared to those taking place in other northern cities. While potentially hindering the
seizure of political power, this fact also allowed for greater community cohesion and would
have made the formation of a group like the BBUF somewhat easier.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Census Tracts—Final Report,” U.S. Censuses of
Population and Housing: 1960. Boston, MA, 1961.
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1961/dec/population-and-housing-phc-1.html.
27
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas,
1960 to 1970: Massachusetts - Final Report,” 1970 Census of Population and Housing. June 1971.
https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/42189394n126ch8.pdf#[0,{%22name%22:%22FitH%22},796].
28
“General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970: Massachusetts – Final Report.”
29
O’Connor, Building, 72-3.
30
King, Chain, 7.
26

19

While a larger stake in politics looked possible, and a tight knit community allowed
for activism and cohesion, the relative growth in their population, coupled with changing city
economics, development, and ever-present racism, made African Americans the primary
target of Massachusetts’ growing carceral state. Historian Simon Balto, in Occupied
Territory, makes the connection between the Second Great Migration, white anxiety, and
increased policing in Chicago during the same period.31 Similar forces would play out in
Boston during the 1960s and manifest themselves in police violence and increased
incarceration for Black Bostonians. As economics and urban renewal restructured Boston’s
social order, lower class white residents looked to the police to reinforce white supremacy,
while wealthier interests wanted the growing population kept out of neighborhoods they
deemed worthy of investment. Police brutality toward Black citizens and the indifference to
the violence in the courts and government were aspects of this process.
Anne Fischer’s work on the treatment of Black women by police and courts in
downtown Boston is especially illustrative of this phenomenon. Black women working as
prostitutes were deemed unfit to live and work in downtown Boston, and were arrested while
white sex workers were not. Upon appearing before a judge, the women were offered the
chance to leave town instead of being sent to prison.32 This example directly demonstrates
the carceral state’s attempts to dislocate Black residents from Boston, but this dynamic
played out daily in less conspicuous ways as members of the Black community were
brutalized and harassed by police, subjected to unfair sentencing, imprisoned, and themselves
made victims of crime. From a wider perspective, the growth in Boston’s Black population
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meant that they would be increasingly targeted by the police because the white power
structure saw them as a hinderance to its economic and social plans.
Racism Among Police and Other Power Brokers in the Carceral System
Seminal to the discussion of race’s role in the carceral state, Michelle Alexander’s
2012 book The New Jim Crow argues that a racial caste system currently exists in the United
States and that this system is perpetuated through mass incarceration, a form of social
control. Alexander traces the origins of mass incarceration to the War on Drugs of the 1980s
while recognizing that the current system of control over African Americans also has roots in
the original Jim Crow laws and slavery. Ultimately, this system, according to Alexander, has
led to the marginalization of a vast underclass—composed primarily of African American
men—who are locked out of mainstream society as well as the American economy.33 The
New Jim Crow’s focus on the explanatory power of race is relevant to the changes that
occurred in postwar Boston and contributed to the growth of the carceral state in
Massachusetts, but alone does not explain them. Coupled with economics, urban renewal,
and demographic change, however, racism did play a significant role in creating and
reinforcing the challenges foisted upon Boston’s Black community.
Balto points out racism as a significant factor in Boston’s police force in a larger
discussion of police attitudes toward African Americans in urban areas during the 1960s. In a
study he cites, seventy-two percent of white police officers expressed highly prejudiced or
“anti-Negro” attitudes. Black officers were not immune either. The same study found that
eighteen percent of Black officers showed “disdain for Black people.”34 Racism obviously
ran high in the BPD and elsewhere. This meant that as Boston’s Black community was
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economically and socially marginalized, and as policing was turned to by the state to control
and dislocate the same population, the Black community would be confronted by armed
officers harboring racist agendas. Racism surely contributed to the willingness of police to
use deadly force with Black Bostonians, leading to the string of police shootings the BBUF
would confront in the early 1970s. Judges, guards, and wardens also harbored racist
sentiments that drove them to treat Black defendants and prisoners more harshly than their
white counterparts.
While the racism endemic in the BPD and the Massachusetts criminal justice system
certainly had an insidious effect on the Black community, it was not explicit state or
municipal policy that African Americans were to be treated differently from other citizens
within the carceral state. Rather, it was the aggregate racism of individuals who exercised
power over the most vulnerable that perpetuated the system. Hirsch describes the racist
motivations behind the rioters who attacked Black neighborhoods in Chicago and the police
who abetted them as failures of individuals. Police officials as well as patrolmen sympathized
with the white mobs who terrorized African Americans in Chicago from the 1940s through
the 1960s.35
In Boston, too, the failures were by individual police officers, judges, or prison
personnel. This does not mean that racism was not systemic in 1960s or 1970s Boston, but
that there were many points within the criminal justice system in which individuals made
decisions driven by race. The impunity with which these decisions were made and their
aggregate effects on Boston’s Black community were what made them systemic. The string
of police shootings of unarmed Black men that rocked Boston’s Black community in the
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early 1970s in particular demonstrate the power that racism exerted when individual police
officers confronted Black citizens. These incidents, and the BBUF’s responses, will be
addressed in more detail in chapter four.
The Carceral State in Massachusetts
The intersectionality that Norton and Stein argue for when analyzing Black
communities’ experiences with the criminal justice system mirrors the perspective of BBUF
leadership. Racism, economics, demographics, education, government policies, class, and
crime were simultaneously on the minds of BBUF leadership and any attempt to disaggregate
them—to propose that one definitely caused the other—is an attempt in futility. Rather, they
are mutually reinforcing social forces that acted to move the BBUF to confront the carceral
state on many fronts at once, just as they led to the societal changes that drove the harsher
approach to criminal justice. The fact that the BBUF understood the interrelated nature of
these forces at such an early juncture, and was able to organize against them, speaks to the
foresight of their leadership and the lived reality of Boston’s Black community in the late
1960s and early 1970s.
The War on Poverty of the 1960s and the War on Drugs of the 1980s were significant
extensions of police power in the United States, but were driven by economics, housing, and
demographic change as well as the racism that has persisted since the first days of the
republic. Balto’s analysis of Chicago’s growing police power during the twentieth century
concludes that these punitive federal projects were not recruiting unwilling or incapable
police departments. Rather, these “wars” piggybacked on the expanded powers and more
aggressive stance that urban police departments had been developing for years.36 Growth in
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police brutality and racialized notions of who criminals were extended into the efforts and
resources put forth by the federal government. Boston was no exception to these trends. By
the early 1970s, a federally funded report had deemed the BPD one of the worst police
departments in the country due to its “notorious reputation for corruption and brutality.”37
Massachusetts’ carceral state did not appear overnight but, as in Chicago, was the result of
decades of urban change coupled with racist police, judges, prison administrations, and city
officials.
In the early 1970s, the carceral apparatus in Massachusetts had not yet grown to the
extent that it would later that decade and in ensuing decades. Yet, the BBUF were working
against the earliest manifestations of what scholars would later term the carceral state. There
were two reasons that the BBUF was able to identify and challenge the problem of treating
poverty with punitive solutions. The first was that Boston’s Black community and the BBUF
had been the victims of an unjust criminal justice system for decades prior to the 1960s. The
racism of the police was certainly not a new occurrence. A second reason that the BBUF
identified and sought to stymie the worst effects of the carceral state was that they
understood the connections between race, economics, demographics, and crime. Their
leadership knew that “the experience of the Negro in American cities has been quite different
from any other group.”38 Most previous inner cities inhabitants, many of them recent
immigrants, had the expectation of moving upward economically and outward spatially, and
many did. But, for African Americans, “the ghetto simply expanded” and became “more
segregated every year.”39 While not as large as some other northern cities, Boston still saw
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similar social forces operating in its inner city, and the effects and responses to those changes
mirrored what was happening elsewhere.
In Boston, like in other Black communities, crime and its prevention were of
particular importance. The BBUF saw crime as something to be prevented with or without
help from the police, but in other cities scholars have found that Black communities
contributed to the growth of the carceral state by electing tough-on-crime politicians and
advocating for stricter prison sentences. Focusing on New York City, Michael Javen
Fortner’s Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment
finds that the root cause of mass incarceration was not racism, economics, urban change,
demographic growth or federal policies, but the conservative backlash within the Black
community to crime and drug abuse. Calling this group of middle-class Black Americans the
“Black Silent Majority,” Fortner argues that following the civil rights movement, Black
Americans in Harlem drew on their traditional morals in reaction to urban crime to call for
harsh punitive measures. Central to the author’s claim is that African Americans were the
most likely victims of crime in the 1960s. This suffering at the hands of criminals, the
argument continues, turned them toward the immediate solution of incarceration. The
development of this view is presented in contrast to that of white liberals who continued to
embrace rehabilitation to a far greater extent.40 Fortner raises an interesting and controversial
idea in this book: how much of mass incarceration can be attributed to the actual desires of
African Americans communities?
One important goal of Fortner’s work is to provide historical agency to the Black
community. Gilmore, Alexander, Clegg and Usmani, Norton and Stein, and Hinton all see
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outside forces and people acting upon African Americans to thrust them into the penal
system. Fortner attempts instead to look at the forces and people acting within the Black
community. While Fortner acknowledges that the Black Silent Majority was not the only
cause of mass incarceration, his book minimizes factors outside of the community that were
important to the creation of a punitive solution to poverty. The agency of Boston’s Black
community has been overlooked in past histories of the carceral state; nonetheless, outside
social forces played a major role in shaping the carceral state as well.
As part of their criminal justice activities, the BBUF were concerned with the
treatment of prisoners and the injustices of the carceral state at the community level. Like
Alexander, the BBUF saw the intrinsic racism of the criminal justice system in Boston, but
they also saw economic and political factors as fundamental factors as well. Fortner’s
emphasis on the agency of the Black community is important when analyzing the BBUF’s
response to the increasingly punitive turn of the state; but, as Hinton notes, “the version of
the War on Crime that many Black activists imagined involved community control,
oversight, and inclusion” in law enforcement.41 So, while Boston’s Black community, acting
through the BBUF, certainly exercised agency, they more closely resembled Hinton’s
description than Fortner’s. The BBUF’s response to the racial, economic, and political forces
that were shaping their reality was to first attempt cooperation with certain facets of the
carceral state, but to turn to community-based solutions as those attempts failed over and
over again.
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Social Justice Movements in Boston Prior to the BBUF, 1930-1970s
Many waves of African American community organizers sought to address education,
economics, housing, and other aspects of mid-century urban social conditions in Boston.
More ephemeral than the BBUF, these groups arose to fight specific challenges that Boston’s
Black community was facing at a specific time, and then faded once their goals had been
achieved or lost momentum in the community. In contrast, the BBUF would exhibit relative
staying power, lasting for almost a decade.
Still, the organization comfortably inhabited a place within the history of the
evolution of Boston’s activist circles. The targets of the earlier reform movements would
continue on in the BBUF, but more importantly, they served as crucibles for future BBUF
leaders to cut their teeth and as sources of established tactics. Notably, no group of Black
activists prior to the BBUF had opposed the carceral state in a systematic manner. This
attests to the growing impact of the carceral state on Boston’s Black community by the late
1960s, but also the perception among BBUF leadership that previous reform attempts in
education, business, welfare, and housing were connected to criminal justice.
From 1930 to 1960, increasing Black activism in Boston coincided with an almost
tripling of the African American population over the same period. During this early phase of
community organizing the focus was on improving the lives of residents of Roxbury and
Dorchester, goals more nebulous than the Twenty-One Demands later put forth by the
BBUF. Some of the primary objectives of Black leaders at the time included racial uplift,
urban planning, and interracial alliances. Muriel Snowden, a Roxbury activist involved in
Boston activist circles from the 1940s through the 1970s, linked racial uplift to reinforcing
democracy. If conditions were to be improved for Boston’s African Americans, in
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Snowden’s view, democracy had to be strengthened in the Black community as well as more
generally in the United States. Urban planning and interracial alliances, too, were on
Snowden’s agenda and linked, particularly when it came to Boston’s Black middle class and
the white officials who ran the city’s government.42
The 1960s was a decade of Black activism in Boston that focused more on specific
issues to improve everyday conditions than before, but ended with many becoming
disillusioned with previous tactics, especially after the assassination of Martin Luther King,
Jr. Reforming public schools was one such area of potential improvement that gained steam
in the early 1960s and still remained relevant in the era of the BBUF. A major component of
this movement, the Stay Out for Freedom boycotts of 1963 and 1964 were an attempt to fix
the deplorable conditions of the segregated Boston Public Schools. Estimates of students
staying home during the first boycott ranged from 2,000 to 5,000 and during the second
around 20,000 students or about twenty percent of the public-school population remained
home.43
These protests raised awareness about educational inequalities in Boston’s public
schools, taught organizers how to rally a significant portion of their community around a
cause, and received attention from newspapers which brought the issue to the notice of
people outside of Boston’s Black community—all tactics that the BBUF would later
incorporate into their toolkit. The school reform movement continued through the late 1960s
and early 1970s with a walkout of 2,000 students in 1971 to protest the dire state of their
schools. While the student movement did not achieve all of its goals, it eventually managed
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to get culturally relevant courses included in the curriculum, raise awareness of the need for
Black faculty, and set the stage for later integration.44 The BBUF was directly involved in
this latter phase of the school reform movement and some of its future leaders were involved
in earlier phases. The power inherent in rallying the community behind an emotional issue
was not lost on them and would become particularly relevant later when they would harness
that power to combat police shootings.
Economic issues presented another front in the battle for justice in early 1960s
Boston. The Boston Action Group (BAG) formed in 1962 to compel businesses to hire Black
workers. Their direct-action approach to activism influenced the BBUF. BAG’s mix of social
workers, community activists, and mostly white college students resembled the interracial
approach to change that was favored during this period but abandoned later in the decade.
Starting with Wonder Bread, BAG first went door-to-door campaigning with flyers
explaining the disparities between Black and white workers. Next, the group approached the
company multiple times to request that more Black workers be hired, but to no avail. Then,
the group mobilized the Black community in a boycott of Wonder Bread. Under this
mounting economic pressure and bad press, the company yielded and hired more Black
workers with promises to continue the practice.45
Other movements for economic justice like Mothers for Adequate Welfare (MAW)
and Centralized Investments to Revitalize Community Living Effectively (CIRCLE)
continued in Boston throughout the 1960s. These were largely protest movements that sought
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to rally community members to show collective support for justice. This was a tactic that the
BBUF would employ later.
CIRCLE, the most influential Boston activist group in the 1960s, played a similar role
to the one the BBUF would play in Boston’s Black community beginning in 1968.46 Started
in 1966, CIRCLE was “an organization of organizations which would pool efforts toward
community development and initiate joint projects.”47 While operating solely in the
economic arena, this idea—of an umbrella organization for various movements within the
Black community—would find purchase two years later in the BBUF as it brought together
disparate organizations and individuals from Boston’s Black community to identify and
address injustices of all types.
Another antecedent to the BBUF was Boston’s housing reform movement of the
1960s. The Community Assembly for a United South End (CAUSE) was ostensibly formed
to fight for fairness in urban development. It did so by organizing tenants’ associations and
protesting unfair housing practices. CAUSE’s larger significance to the BBUF, though, lies
in its attempt to create a governing body for Boston’s Black community that would use its
political power to fight for their interests. Despite being limited to housing issues, the
foundational concept of CAUSE, the idea that a group would unite other groups and act in
the interest of all Black Bostonians, paralleled the later approach of the BBUF. CAUSE
achieved some success on specific issues, but its long-term impact was as a source of
inspiration to later activists.48
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As the 1960s wore on, the civil rights movement picked up momentum and there
were concrete gains in Boston and other parts of the United States, but many activists became
embittered by the recalcitrance of the white population and the slow progress that Black
Americans were making with collaborative efforts. As a leader in Boston’s Black
community—and a reflection of it—Snowden too made the shift from racial uplift, urban
planning, and interracial alliances to focus on Black consciousness and self-reliance.49
The BBUF, forming at the end of the 1960s, was firmly within the latter camp. The
organization and its leadership retained some of the features of the earlier era like urban
planning and occasional interracial alliances, but it tempered them with a distrust of the white
power structure and the assumption that they themselves were ultimately responsible for
building power within their community in order to achieve any significant change. This
perpetual tension within Boston’s Black activist circles would continue during the BBUF’s
battles to reform the early carceral state.
Rhetorical Response to the Carceral State
Since it was chanted by a segment of the demonstrators during the 1966 Freedom
March across Mississippi, the Black Power slogan has rhetorically and ideologically
influenced groups like the BBUF. The Black Power movement may have been born of the
civil rights era, but it grew in strength in the period immediately afterward. By some
accounts, Black Power was an inward turn for African Americans, the result of
disillusionment and hardening among activists, especially after the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.; however, this understanding is far from a settled debate in the
historical literature. Black Power can also be viewed as part of the long, diverse lineage of
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African American political thought.50 No matter the interpretation of the origins of Black
Power, Stokely Carmichael’s speech at the Roxbury YMCA and Dr. King’s assassination
directly influenced the foundation of the BBUF, placing the organization squarely in the
Black Power era.
The BBUF, however, was not purely a Black Power group; other factors like the
history of Black activism in Boston and lived conditions of Black Bostonians must also be
considered. Its diverse constituents, grounded in prior local social movements, and conditions
specific to Boston, meant that it had to balance between Black Power’s ideological
pronouncements and more pragmatic concerns. Black Power provided a framework for the
BBUF to mount a rhetorical response to the carceral state, but for the group it was not a rigid
ideology. The BBUF used Black Power rhetoric to inspire, recruit, and mobilize community
members for operations, but were willing to go outside of its strictures to try to achieve their
goals.
In Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, Kwame Ture (formerly known as Stokely
Carmichael) and Charles V. Hamilton laid out the foundation of Black Power as an ideology
that enables African Americans to achieve the goals of the civil rights movement without
relying on the white power structure. Collaboration, as the authors see it, corrupted previous
attempts to improve the conditions of Black Americans, and therefore new institutions had to
be formed within the Black community so that they can “bargain from a position of
strength.”51 Ture, as the leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee,
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participated in countless protests in the 1960s and traveled around the country giving
speeches. Ture’s speech in Boston in 1967 was but one stop on that tour.
Throughout their existence, and particularly in the area of criminal justice reform, the
BBUF wrestled with the idea of collaboration. Whether their focus was police shootings,
courts, prisons, or crime, the BBUF always sought to build institutions in Boston’s Black
community that were independent of the white power structure. At the same time, however,
there were numerous attempts to work with the mayor, prison wardens, the city council, and
other institutional powers. In many cases, the turn toward the Black Power ethos for the
BBUF was a reaction to failed attempts at change through traditional channels. Notably, the
BBUF did work as part of an interracial alliance to help prevent construction of a highway
that would have destroyed many Black neighborhoods in the heart of Boston. However, this
alliance was with like-minded anti-highway activists, rather than those in positions of
governmental, business, or political power.52 Actors within the carceral state proved
particularly difficult to work with and thus the BBUF often ended up eschewing
collaboration.
This is where the rhetoric of the Black Power movement heavily influenced the
BBUF. Although the BBUF never completely opposed collaboration with the larger white
power structures of Boston, nor were they an exclusively working-class movement, their
focus on empowering the Black community, nationalism, and self-reliance was in line with
other Black Power groups of the time. As the organization developed its ideological
foundations in 1968, Black laws, political philosophy and nationalism became important
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conceptual touchstones. These ideas were put to use largely in building institutions within the
Black community rather than as outward facing documents for wider public consumption.
Outside of their base in Boston’s Black community, BBUF rhetoric was decidedly
more nuanced. Some of the calls within the Twenty-One Demands issued by the group in
April 1968, such as all white owned businesses in the Black community should be turned
over to the BBUF immediately, for example, were stunning in their audacity. The BBUF’s
quick public diminution of the Demands, however, revealed a shrewd leadership that was not
rigid in their commitment to them. Such ultimatums used tactically were just a starting point
for negotiations.53 Similarly, calls were made for the complete abolition of prisons within the
internal documents of the BBUF while leaders attempted to work with prison administrators
to make small gains for Black prisoners.
The code switching of the BBUF’s rhetoric was in some ways more along the lines of
one of Black Power’s greatest critics, Martin Luther King, Jr. Writing in 1967, Dr. King was
an early and powerful voice against the movement. He mostly found fault with the rhetoric of
Black Power, rather than with its goals. King believed that Black Power as a slogan “carried
the wrong connotations.”54 According to him, use of the phrase in public would isolate Black
activists and give racist whites another excuse for their segregationist beliefs. The civil rights
leader warned that only through federal intervention would African Americans be able to
overcome the economic and political barriers placed in front of them, and that the Black
Power slogan jeopardized this assistance. King also famously rejected violence as a means to
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achieve the goals of the civil rights movement in contrast to some Black Power leaders who
were more open to its use.55
King’s criticisms of Black Power were incorporated, consciously or not, into the
BBUF. It is notable, however, that he was more concerned with the appearance of isolationist
tendencies than with why they were being promoted in the first place. While Dr. King
remained steadfast in his support of collaboration and integration, he understood the
frustration and anger that motivated Black Power advocates. Much of the rhetoric espoused
by the BBUF was that of Black Power; nevertheless, the group’s actions belied a pure
isolationist worldview. More accurately, the BBUF attempted to work with Boston officials,
accepted funding from wealthy white Bostonians, and welcomed moderate and conservative
Black businesses and organizations to their ranks. By taking this perspective seriously—a
combination of the legacy of the civil rights movement, Black Power, and local
circumstances—the many motivations of the people and organizations behind the BBUF can
best be understood. Black Power was neither dogma nor anathema. Rather, it was a tool to
advance their cause.
Because a complex negotiation of ideals and pragmatism existed within the Black
Power movement itself, there is not one definition to sum it up. The Black Panther Party
(BPP) of Oakland, California, like the BBUF, exhibited these complexities. Comparing the
BPP and BBUF provides insight into two contemporaneous Black Power organizations and
shows that there were many shared elements between Black Power groups. But just as often,
local conditions dictated a group’s outlook. In this comparison, a distinction must be made
between the BPP before and after 1968. During the earlier period, the BPP was largely
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concerned with directly combatting the carceral state. Their primary methods for doing so
were police patrols and armed self-defense. The later period saw a shift to communityfocused programming like free school lunches and liberation schools. Some scholars have
argued that this lack of a direct challenge to the carceral state represented an
acknowledgement that the BPP had lost the battle. Historian Donna Jean Murch, however,
argues that the later period was a return to the roots of African American organizing in
California that emphasized “churches, sororal/fraternal groups, mutual-aid societies, ‘welfare
rights’ organizing, and electoral representation.”56
Both the pre-1968 BPP and the BBUF in the 1970s were concerned with combatting
the carceral state. They both took on some of the powers of local government when they
could not get justice through them, created coalitions with white allies, and had community
roots in waves of Black migrants to their cities. At the same time, the BPP fielded police
patrols, had a great deal of internal conflict, stuck with a stricter Marxist orientation, and
used a democratic centralist organizational structure, none of which were features of the
BBUF.57 The BBUF organized street patrols to combat crime and organized against police
shootings, but never took a direct role in policing the police. There is also no evidence of any
major conflicts within the leadership of the BBUF. At least in part this can be attributed to
the democratic nature of the organization. There were committees like in the BPP, but
matters were settled by voting within the committees and in community meetings.
Contrastingly, the BPP was a top-down organization where conflicts between leaders and
with members abounded. Likewise, the BPP’s Marxist worldview was less dynamic than the
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BBUF’s simultaneous embrace of pragmatic actions and Black nationalist rhetoric.
Interestingly, unlike either the BPP or BBUF, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, another Black Power group headed by Stokely Carmichael, did not coordinate
with white allies at all.58
The BBUF embraced Black Power’s rhetoric, but its operations differed drastically
from better-known Black Power adherents. The conditions in Boston throughout the 1960s
and the long history of community-based social movements prior to the BBUF’s formation
exercised just as much influence on the group as Black Power. The negotiation between these
forces occurred within the BBUF throughout its history, in contrast to the BPP shift from a
carceral focus to one of community. As Russell Rickford argues in his examination of Black
Power in Harlem’s schools, for the BBUF, Black Power was never an extremist or rigid
philosophy. Instead, it was a tool that the community used to understand power structures
through “multiple, intersecting channels.”59 In scrutinizing the historical role of the BBUF,
the multifaceted roles of Black Power as ideology and rhetoric need to be considered as
important elements of the BBUF’s operational paradigm, both in its internal workings and
how it interfaced with Boston’s white power structure.
Operational Response to the Carceral State
The operational responses of the BBUF to the nascent carceral apparatus were
simultaneously rooted within Boston’s activist history and indicative of the new Black Power
movement’s more aggressive approach to injustice, particularly in policing and prisons.
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While there is no evidence that the BBUF armed themselves to protect their community
against the police like the BPP, their actions on carceral issues in the late 1960s and early
1970s placed them, albeit uncomfortably, within the same camp. Instead of confronting the
carceral state in Massachusetts with guns and police patrols, the BBUF favored rallies, poster
campaigns, community meetings, petitioning white leaders, and protecting Black citizens and
businesses from criminals.
The BBUF’s focus on criminal justice itself was a departure from prior reform
movements that had acted on education, housing, welfare, jobs and other issues, but largely
left policing, prisons, courts, and crime alone. One reason for the BBUF’s new focus was that
the processes of inner-city economic decline, urban renewal, and demographic change had
yet to lead the state to take a carceral approach to urban poverty prior to their era. Racism
among police had always been a problem, but in the 1950s and early 1960s the fights were
against the issues that affected the day-to-day lives of Black Bostonians. The Stay Out for
Freedom protests, BAG, CIRCLE, and CAUSE all sought to improve things that people dealt
with regularly, like schools, businesses, and housing. The increasing impact of the carceral
system on Black lives during this period, however, would add it to the list of important topics
to address by the end of the 1960s.
Another reason that the BBUF’s response to the carceral state was innovative was
that it reflected a larger shift among Boston activists from racial uplift, alliances with white
activists, and large-scale urban planning projects to focus on promoting and protecting the
Black community from within. The belief that working with the white power structure for the
betterment of Boston’s Black citizens had fallen out of favor. The BBUF era was one of selfreliance. After decades of opposition from white people to the integration of schools and
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neighborhoods, lack of access to fair jobs and wages, and experiencing violence at the hands
of police and other racists, alternative approaches became desirable.
Police violence was one part of the carceral state where the BBUF would focus a
large portion of their energy. A string of shootings of unarmed Black men between 1970 and
1972 was met by the BBUF with rallies, trials, posters, and demands to city hall. Petitioning
for Black judges was another important prong in the BBUF approach to fixing the carceral
system. Attempting to place African Americans in positions of power within the carceral
state had not always proven fruitful for activists’ goals, but many believed that it was
required to begin to create a fair process. Prison reform was another area in which the BBUF
actively sought to change the direction of what would eventually become the mass
incarceration of Black men in America. They worked on this issue both by approaching
prison administrations and by directly helping to uplift prisoners’ lives. Finally, community
security patrols were favored by the BBUF in order to protect Boston’s Black community
from criminals. This spoke to a rising concern about crime in their neighborhoods, but also a
lack of faith in the police and the larger carceral system, a theme that ran through all of the
actions that the BBUF took.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BBUF IN CONCEPT AND OPERATION

Structural Problems and New Organizational Methods
At the heart of the BBUF were two ideas. One was that the problems facing Black
Bostonians, and the failure of years of protest to solve them, were structural and deeply
ingrained in city life. The truth of this knowledge was borne out by individual experience as
well as the violent backlash to the civil rights movement from segments of white America.
The indignities suffered by Boston’s African Americans—including the inferior schools they
were forced to send their children to, the good paying jobs that were denied to them by
colluding companies, and the impunity with which police officers could harass and assault
them—were equally considered within the BBUF alongside the large scale mid-century
social movement that sought to improve and empower Black lives through marches, sit-ins,
and boycotts.
The second idea animating the group was that new organizational methods and
strategy were needed to face these perpetual roadblocks to progress. Carmichael’s Black
Power exhortations, Dr. King’s assassination, Boston’s history of community activism, urban
change, and the burgeoning carceral state were all interwoven into the tapestry of Boston’s
Black experience and the formation of the BBUF. What was new about the BBUF was its
attempt to unite the community, and organizations that served it, under one umbrella. This
was a bold idea for two reasons. For one, Boston’s Black community was ideologically and
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culturally diverse. This meant that there were those who embraced Black Power, others who
eschewed it, and many between these two poles. Likewise, some favored what could be
called a socialist agenda, while others thought that small businesses and Black ownership
were the keys to a better future.
Initial funding for the BBUF came from an unlikely source: wealthy white
businessmen. Although alliances between wealthy liberals and Black Power activists were
not unprecedented, it was often an uneasy partnership.60 The BBUF’s most prominent donor,
Ralph Hoagland, a co-founder of CVS, led a group of Boston businessmen who formed the
Fund for Urban Negro Development (FUND), the key source of the BBUF’s early funding.
Over the course of four years, FUND transferred a half million dollars to the BBUF. The
BBUF distributed the bulk of the money to Black-owned businesses and kept the remainder
for operating costs. The irony of taking significant funds from wealthy white business
interests was not lost on BBUF leadership, but the desire to invest that money in Boston’s
Black community was too great to let the opportunity pass.61
To put their ideas and funding into action, the BBUF’s founders created a sweeping
activist organization meant to be a direct reflection of the concerns of Boston’s Black
community. Many actions during the civil rights era in Boston were headed by different
organizations—albeit often by the same activists. Coordination across the community and
diverse issues required a high degree of bureaucratic organization. The BBUF was headed by
a Steering Committee of veteran activists like Chuck Turner, Leroy Boston, George
Morrison, Bertram Alleyne, Drew King, Chuck Williams, Daleno Farrar, and Francine Mills.
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Beneath them sat committees that were focused on specific issues like crime, justice, prisons,
education, housing, mobilization, and internal operations. These committees were the means
by which the BBUF organized. About eighty-five organizations participated in the BBUF
including the New Urban League, Freedom Industries, the Roxbury Historical Society, Tufts
Afro-American Society, St. Cyprian’s Episcopal Church, and the Black Panther Party. What
united these diverse people and organizations was their desire to see positive political,
economic, and social changes for Black Bostonians.
To a large extent, the BBUF's successes were due to a high level of organization,
attested to by the substantial documentation in their archive. This was also a factor in their
longevity. As Mel King, a leader with the Urban League and BBUF, describes in Chain of
Change, the lifecycle for activist organizations in Boston was typically only a few years. 62
While the BBUF eventually faded away in the mid-1970s as support from wealthy white
businessmen waned, they had been active in Boston for the better part of a decade. This
allowed them to have a large impact in many issues significant to Boston’s Black
community, none more so than criminal justice reform.
Organization by Committee
Immediately after forming the BBUF, its leadership, member organizations, and
individual participants went about addressing the most pressing issues facing Boston’s Black
citizens. Each area of focus was spearheaded by committees which were then overseen by the
Steering Committee, a collection of the most influential community leaders in the BBUF who
were able to coordinate the diverse array of actions that their program called for.63 The
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structure and breadth of the BBUF organization reflected the experiences of activists who
had been involved in many of the civil rights actions of the preceding two decades and the
wide-ranging community support that allowed them to field groups that could take on these
issues. If activism in Boston’s Black community during the civil rights era had been a
collection of disparate and ephemeral groups, the BBUF, in contrast, was built to be a longlasting umbrella organization.
Most committees met regularly in the late 1960s and into the early 1970s. The
Steering Committee, in its role as the executive level meeting for the organization, addressed
issues from the other groups and acted as the BBUF decision making body. On January 13,
1969 alone, the Steering Committee took up issues as diverse as a funding proposal from
CAUSE, protests against a TV show, activities for Malcolm X Day, Turner’s interview on a
radio show, boycotting a Volvo dealership, organizing Black churches, and internal problems
with other community organizations.64 As evidenced by the wide range of meeting topics,
energy and ambition ran high among the leadership of the BBUF. More concretely, however,
this vigor was translated into tangible results by the committees that worked under the
direction of the Steering Committee.
Out of sixteen total committees, the BBUF devoted four to criminal justice issues.
Having put so many of their resources toward this effort, it is apparent that this was a major
issue for the group, if not the most important one. The Justice Committee was one of the
most active BBUF committees and was most heavily involved in the actions that the BBUF
took on police shootings. The Defense Committee, Prison Committee and the Committee on
Crime similarly worked on criminal justice issues. In the case of the last of these, the group
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developed a detailed plan to organize, finance, and recruit a Black security corps to protect
the community. This ultimately came to fruition in the security patrols that would begin
walking Boston’s streets in 1970. The police shootings of unarmed Black men that would
rock Boston’s Black community between 1970 and 1972 were addressed by the Justice
Committee. Letters to city officials were sent, reports of eyewitnesses to the shootings were
read, and organization and procedures for community trials were hammered out at committee
meetings.65 When taken as a whole, the BBUF’s work on carceral state reform was channeled
through these groups.
Unfortunately, there are only two full sets of meeting minutes for the BBUF Justice
Committee, along with several ancillary documents like membership lists and draft letters in
the BBUF archive. Despite this dearth of written material, what is available shows deep
involvement in the events of the day, and it is clear that the committee’s biggest concerns
were police abuse, repercussions for said abuse, and publicizing their response to garner
further support.66 The “Poster Day” that followed the murder of Franklin Lynch was perhaps
the Justice Committee’s biggest undertaking. The coordination and planning for this event
were done by Justice Committee mobilization of individuals and business owners. One draft
letter notes that those businesses that hung posters in their windows were harassed by city
police officers or had their posters stolen.67 Nonetheless, the posters became a common site
within the Black neighborhoods of Boston.
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The BBUF Committee on Crime, like the Justice Committee, played a part in fighting
the carceral state’s effects on Boston’s Black community. Spurred to action by the robbery of
Unity Bank in December 1970 and the murder of two security guards at Freedom Foods in
1971, the most significant document produced by the Committee on Crime was “An Outline
Proposal for the Establishment of a Community Crime Commission.” This detailed document
proposed to create a political arm to fight crime alongside the Community Security Agency
(CSA), the action-oriented outgrowth of the Committee on Crime. Working together, these
two sub-organizations of the BBUF were to oversee crime prevention in a community seeing
increasing crime rates.
An initial $15,000 was allocated by the United Front Foundation to get the
Community Crime Commission started. The charges of the commission were to hire
employees, collect funds, wage a publicity campaign against crime, push their agenda in the
media, work with the BPD and the Attorney’s Office, receive complaints from community
residents, and write a proposal for funding. Job descriptions and a budget were drawn up as
part of the plan too. The recommended commissioners in the proposal included reporters,
business people, a Muslim minister, community leaders, and politicians.68 The broad swath
of community members asked to work on this issue as well as the broad mandate for the
commission indicates how dire the situation had become for the community and what little
faith Black Bostonians had that the white power structure would respond accordingly. The
liaison duties of the commission speak to some degree of willingness to cooperate with
authorities, but it is obvious that this was the work of a frustrated community attempting to
come up with their own solution to an intractable problem rather than waiting on a cavalry
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that would never arrive. Unlike those of the CSA, the Community Crime Commission’s
specific activities are not well documented, but the attempts to work with the BPD and
mayor’s office during the string of police shootings of unarmed Black men indicate that to
some degree the committee was at work.
Like the Justice Committee and the Committee on Crime, the Prison Committee was
most active in the early 1970s. Just as those committees focused on discrete areas of the
carceral state, police reform and crime respectively, the Prison Committee sought changes in
the prisons and jails of Massachusetts. Due to the separation of inmates from society,
however, the Prison Committee did not operate like other BBUF committees, typically
collections of leaders and activists from Boston’s Black community. Instead, the Prison
Committee focused on the conditions and rights of prisoners, especially incarcerated African
Americans, with the long-term goal of prison abolition. In 1971, the Prison Committee
dedicated itself to working as the arm of the Act Committee, a group formed by prisoners at
Norfolk Prison.69 In this role, the BBUF’s committee served as a liaison between Boston’s
Black community and those on the inside.
Although mass incarceration was in its infancy, the BBUF recognized the importance
of working on prison reform due to its disproportionate effects on African Americans. The
intertwining threads of the carceral state were only beginning to form during the BBUF’s
active period, but it was already apparent to activists and community leaders that the changes
were necessary. This understanding placed the BBUF ahead of their time. While most
politicians, judges, police officers, and city bureaucrats were largely unaware of or
indifferent to the suffering of those in Boston’s Black community, the BBUF was attempting
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to address the growing carceral state decades before white America acknowledged what was
happening.
Ideology for a “Non-ideological” Organization
When activists, politicians, revolutionaries, business owners, community
organizations, and concerned citizens came together in 1968 to form the BBUF, their shortterm goal was “operational unity.” In concept, the BBUF was to transcend ideology to
achieve the goals that were shared by all Black Bostonians. In practice, this meant that there
was room for ideological diversity, even conflict. Intermediate goals included creating or
strengthening Black organizations and controlling funds that would benefit the Black
community. In due course, though, the BBUF sought to separate completely from Boston by
incorporating its African American sections as an entirely new city. Leaders acknowledged
that this would not solve all of the Black community’s problems, but they believed that it was
the only solution that would give them a chance to bypass the white power structure
entrenched in the local, state, and municipal governments.70 Even though their ultimate goal
was never achieved—separation from Boston was attempted during the 1980s Mandela
referendums—the BBUF’s smaller scale organizational aspirations did eventually become a
reality.
Operational unity was resoundingly successful for the BBUF. Churches and trade
groups sat at the table with the Black Panthers and the Malcolm X Foundation.71 This speaks
to the shared legacy of racism that Black Bostonians had endured throughout their lives as
well as the continuing obstacles that discrimination had placed in their paths regardless of
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their ideal conception of society. The decentralized and single issue-based approaches that
Boston activists had taken during the 1950s and 1960s gave way to a more unified approach
embodied by the BBUF. When understood within the larger context of African American
activism up until 1968 in Boston, the BBUF’s doctrine of operational unity was a direct
rejoinder to what many viewed as insufficient progress.
Indicative of the unified approach that gave name to the BBUF, each member
organization’s president or representative officer was required to sign a statement of
commitment to a “Black United Front in Boston.” With this pledge, the signee agreed to
identify a voting representative from their organization. Furthermore, this representative was
required to identify as Black and the organizational member would commit to a program of
majority rule within the umbrella group.72 Committing to sending a Black representative
ensured that organizations were either already part of the Black community or were at least
integrated enough to have a Black person in a leadership position. As for the internal
machinery of the BBUF, the promise to abide by majority rule indicates a commitment to
democracy as the means of governing a wide-ranging organization.
In many ways, the BBUF was the executive, judicial, and legislative branch for
Boston’s Black community, and, although community members were victims of gross
injustices in a democratic nation, the organization remained committed to democracy
anyway. Community-based democracy was substituted for state-based democracy in reaction
to the abuses of power by Boston’s white dominated institutions. The commitment to
democracy was important for the BBUF, but the injustices of American democracy meant
they needed to apply this principle in new ways. Like the concept of democracy, in the
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impulse to attempt reconciliation with carceral institutions, and as community trials and
security patrols would later show in their fight for criminal justice reform, the BBUF did not
find fault with the ideas of policing, prisons, and courts in theory, but found the iniquities
within these institutions and how they had been used to control and exploit Black Americans
to be the true problem.
In spite of the BBUF’s claims to ideological transcendence, unity was not created
around shared grievances alone. A great deal of effort was made by the BBUF to also create
shared principles that would unite Boston’s Black community and pave the way for a Black
separatist future. Throughout the BBUF’s history of actions, including those seeking reform
in the carceral state, organizers would continually refer back to those foundational documents
in which they envisioned a new society. These seminal papers included proposed laws,
statements of political philosophy and Black national principles, and culminated in twentyone public demands to the city government. This aspect of operational unity informed the
BBUF’s future actions against the growing carceral state.
On November 2, 1969, the BBUF’s eight Black Laws were ratified by a vote of those
attending a conference at the Urban League Barn. Laws one and two deal with encountering
“enemy authorities.” The first of these dictates that Black people must help one another
whenever someone is in trouble with oppressive authorities. The second law prohibits Black
people from giving any other Black person’s name to the police. Following those laws, the
third and fourth laws establish the supremacy of the “high council” and forbid Black people
from seeking justice outside of that body. The fifth, sixth, and seventh laws explain how
Black people are to protect the rights of the entire community. The final law exhorts Black
people to disregard worldly desires, especially the desire for money, in favor of solidarity.
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An addendum of “intolerable offenses” was attached to the Blacks Laws. Those offenses
included raping, killing, betraying, luring into drug use, or assaulting any Black person.73
Upon a cursory glance, these laws may seem like the rules of an imagined Black separatist
state. In fact, they quite closely hewed to the principles that the BBUF would put into
practice not long after their creation as they sought to provide alternatives to the carceral
state.
One area in which the BBUF’s ideology guided their operations was in combatting
police brutality. From 1970 to 1972, the BBUF was engaged in direct action following four
police killings of unarmed Black men, the details of which will be discussed in the next
chapter. In these instances, the Black Laws were transformed from words on paper to action
among Boston’s African American community, creating solidarity around an alternative
justice system in which Black people could find fairness. Nothing exemplified this
alternative like the trials that the BBUF held for the offending officers in two cases.
Following what was seen as an inability or unwillingness on the part of white authorities to
hold officers accountable, the BBUF held their own trials, invoking the supremacy of the
community’s judgement over that of white society, and attempted to hold those found guilty
responsible. Distrust of the white power structure and self-reliance came to the fore in these
laws and became the primary means by which justice would become reconceptualized by the
group.
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The BBUF political platform was a list of eight things that they believed they needed
to control to address the plight of Black Bostonians: land, politics, security, justice, schools,
economy, housing, and communication.74 Comparable to the other ideological formulations
for operational unity, the BBUF political platform most directly called out the insufficient
state of security and justice in Boston for African Americans and identified what needed to
be done. Security included protection from crimes and invasion. Later, as the BBUF created
the Community Security Agency (CSA) this concept was put into practice. The CSA
patrolled Black businesses in order to prevent crime, but also to provide an alternative to the
Boston police, viewed as an external threat to the community. The other prong of the
political platform relevant to the carceral state was the administration of justice. This
declaration presaged the community-controlled courts that would soon be needed after police
who shot unarmed Black men were acquitted in white courts.
Human rights, too, were an important element of the BBUF’s belief in how justice
would be achieved. The rights of people were placed above those of property as this
alternative system of justice was formulated. The inhumanity of the Black experience in the
American justice system connected the BBUF movement to all those who sought the basic
rights to which all individuals and groups are entitled.
Less tangible than the Black Laws or BBUF political platform, but just as influential
on the BBUF’s movement for a fair criminal justice system, was its Nation Building
Concept. Likely created around the same time as the Black Laws, BBUF ideas for a Black
nation were just as relevant to the criminal justice initiatives of the group in the coming
years. According to the drafters of the Concept, a Black nation was to be based on the seven
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principles of Kwanzaa: umoja (unity), kujichagulia (self-determination), ujima (collective
work and responsibility), ujamaa (co-operative economics), nia (purpose), kuumba
(creativity), and Imani (faith).75 Taking criminal justice into their own hands, the BBUF
embraced what they saw as the principles that would guide them as an autonomous people,
separate from the system that had oppressed them for so long. The balance between
combatting the racist carceral state and visions of a utopian future were not separate.
Creating the principles of the society that they hoped to achieve one day gave the BBUF and
Boston’s Black community measuring posts by which to compare the current state of affairs.
Contrasting the philosophical bent of the aforementioned documents, the Twenty-One
Demands issued to Mayor Kevin White by the BBUF in April 1968 were a concrete
manifestation of their guiding ideology. Externally, the Demands were issued to get the
attention of the wider world with the hope of gaining concessions. Internal to the Black
community they served to further create unity and provide guideposts for progress like
previously issued steering documents. Above all other Demands, the one for police
departments in Black areas to be overseen by Black captains most directly spoke to the future
push for greater Black representation within the criminal justice system.
In general, however, the Demands were a cry for control over the destiny of the Black
community and an end to its exploitation along political, economic, educational, and policing
lines that reverberated in the actions of BBUF activists as they sought a criminal justice
structure outside of what they perceived as the failed American one. In fact, the opening lines
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of the Demands declare a state of emergency for Boston’s Black community, going so far as
to declare it unsafe for African Americans to go about their normal lives.76
Rallying the Community
In the early days of the BBUF a lot of energy was spent creating solidarity around the
idea of the BBUF and the issues it championed. Issuance of the BBUF’s attention-grabbing
Twenty-One Demands and Black Solidarity Day, a rally against racism and repression, were
the two most prominent events that created a sense of unity and heralded the beginning of a
new community-focused power. In addition to their rallying effect in the Black community,
these events sent a message to white Bostonians—the Demands directly and Black Solidarity
Day less so—that society needed to change. The Demands were reprinted in the Boston
Globe and caused a stir among other groups within Boston and the surrounding area. They
also got the attention of Mayor White, who later met with the group to discuss them. In light
of the later actions by the BBUF, these events can also be viewed as precursors to the rallies
that would help bring attention to the issue of police violence.
In April 1968, the BBUF held a packed rally at White Stadium, a 10,000-seat venue
in Franklin Park. At the event the leadership presented the Twenty-One Demands to the
Black community and implored Boston’s Mayor White to heed their call for justice.77 In A
People’s History of the New Boston, Jim Vrabel argues that the BBUF’s demands “could
hardly have been more extreme” and that they were put forth by “militants.” The author goes
on to argue that the NAACP put forth another set of demands, and that because these were
well received by City Hall, they were moderate and realistic.78 This treatment of the event
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and the organization ignores several factors. For one, the BBUF certainly contained members
who could have been considered militants, like the Boston Black Panther Party, but much of
its membership was far from it, including organizations such as Freedom Industries and the
New Urban League. A second problem with Vrabel’s interpretation is that the BBUF had the
explicit support of 10,000 Black community members and many others who did not attend
the rally, demonstrating that this was a mainstream movement.
Another problem with Vrabel’s understanding is that he ignores the rhetorical
purpose of the Twenty-One Demands. The BBUF’s subsequent negotiations with Mayor
White showed the more pragmatic approach that BBUF leadership would use time and time
again. On April 11, 1968, following the rally and the issuance of the Demands, Mel King,
Chuck Turner, Leroy Boston, and other BBUF leaders met with the mayor, but stated that the
demands that were read at the rally, sent to the mayor, and published in the Boston Globe
were only an opening salvo in an attempt to start a dialogue.79 The rally and the Demands
had gained the attention of Boston’s mayor and the newspaper reading public, but BBUF
leadership was willing to negotiate. This pragmatic approach to the BBUF’s Demands
eventually led to most of them being put in place in some form, albeit many of the changes
took decades rather than months or years.80 Vrabel completely ignores this fact.
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Black Solidarity Day was held on May 19, 1970. The day included awareness
sessions, a march through Roxbury, workshops, music, speakers, and a showing of the film
“Battle of Algiers.” An African ceremonial feast at the Roxbury Boys Club wrapped
up the day.81 It was an event that brought Boston’s Black community together in pride and
consciousness. Mel King, then the head of the New Urban League in Boston, was one of the
keynote speakers. The theme of King’s speech was self-taxation, but underlying it was the
sense of self-reliance and limited help from the white community that underpinned BBUF
efforts on criminal justice. In fact, King’s ideas for community control through self-taxation
included decriminalizing some illegal activities. In particular, he called for the legalization
and taxation of “numbers,” the illegal lottery run by the mafia according to King.82 The
connections between crime, community control, and justice were clear to King as they were
to the other leaders of the BBUF.
Through committees, rallies, and ideology, the BBUF were able to unite Boston’s
Black community on a range of issues. Criminal justice reform was at the top of the group’s
list and each of these tactics were used to garner support for other actions around police
shootings, court appointments, prison reform, and community security. The rally for the
Twenty-One Demands and Black Solidarity Day set the stage for the protests and trials
against police brutality that the BBUF would lead. Likewise, the BBUF committees would be
the spring boards used by the group to act. Finally, the Black Power inspired ideology
developed by the BBUF was used to create community cohesion and would reverberate in
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their agitations for Black judges and the fair treatment of Black prisoners, as well as in
community security patrols.
While BBUF leadership was able to unite individuals and organizations from across
Boston’s Black community on a range of issues, they were ultimately unable to stop the
growth of the carceral state in Massachusetts. Due to the systemic nature of the carceral state,
a community-based response had serious limits, but it was the primary type of response that
the BBUF had available to them. As the 1970s wore on, the end of funding from wealthy
white donors, a national recession, school desegregation, and the City of Boston’s near
municipal bankruptcy either made it more difficult for the BBUF to stop the encroaching
carceral state or meant that activists and city leaders were focused elsewhere. Compounding
these multiple crises was the continued flight of white residents, jobs, and capital to locations
outside of the urban center. The growth of the carceral state paralleled these social processes
and was inextricably bound up with them. The social conditions that made it difficult to offer
a community-based alternative to the carceral state in the 1960s and 1970s are what make
today’s reforms difficult to implement as well.
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CHAPTER 4
THE BBUF AND POLICE VIOLENCE, COURTS, PRISONS, AND CRIME

Criminal Justice Reform
The BBUF was acutely aware of the interrelated nature of police shootings, court
appointments, prisons, poverty, government, and racism and how these social forces
burdened their community. Contemporary scholars have developed the concept of the
carceral state to describe the intersection of communities and criminal justice institutions,
but, as early as the late 1960s, the BBUF was already working against it. At the height of
their activity, the BBUF took actions on police shootings, court appointments, prisons, and
community security—all at roughly the same time. The breadth and scope of their organizing
speaks to an energized, well-funded organization as well as leadership that recognized the
systemic nature of the problems stacked against Boston’s Black community. Both their
successes and failures in combatting the carceral state are important historical antecedents to
current attempts at reform, as well as valuable lessons on the limits of institutional
cooperation and resistance.
Disturbing parallels exist between the circumstances that launched BBUF direct
action and the police killings of so many unarmed Black men in recent years. The brutal
nature of the early 1970s killings—and the lack of consequences for the officers involved—
are familiar to anyone who reads newspaper headlines today. What is often
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overlooked today is that neither police shootings of Black people nor the outrage that follow
them is new. In the four killings by police in which the BBUF sought justice, only one
resulted in what could be considered success at the institutional level: the dismissal of the
offending officer.
The three other kinds of reform efforts that the BBUF undertook—in courts, prisons,
and security—similarly offer lessons for those seeking justice within the network of
institutions that deal with crime. Here, too, the BBUF struggled to find success at the
institutional level and, in the case of community security, eschewed working with city and
state institutions almost entirely. The gap between what Boston’s Black community wanted
for its members and what white-dominated institutions were willing to provide attest to the
systemic racism that is at the heart of the carceral state. Police killing with impunity, judges
who justified the violence, prisons that sought only to dehumanize, and neighborhoods left
unprotected were the symptoms as well as causes of this cycle in Boston, with each aspect of
the carceral state feeding off the others.
At the community level, the BBUF achieved a great deal of cooperation and, for a
time, inspired thousands to believe that change was possible. Their protests set the template
for the organization and publicity that would be used in later decades to protest the same
injustices. Likewise, their demands for accountability from city government and suggestions
for reform would not be taken up in many cases until the present. Their calls for greater
Black representation on the police force, in court rooms, and in decision-making bodies echo
reforms that continue to be advocated for today. The BBUF were ahead of their time and
their struggles offer lessons about which strategies work as well as where some of the pitfalls
may lie for anyone seeking to end the injustices inherent in the carceral state. Studying the
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BBUF’s rallying of a broad coalition, development of innovative tactics and strategies, and
attempts to work across racial divides provides new insights on the history of Boston as well
as the Black American struggle.
Police Shootings
Beginning in 1970, the BBUF acted as an investigative body and court for police
shootings that they believed would not otherwise have received proper scrutiny. At the same
time, the frequency of police shootings of Black men in Boston in the early 1970s
demonstrated to all the impunity with which the BPD was able to mete out violence without
fear of repercussion. While shootings and other acts of police brutality were not new to
Boston, what was new was that the BBUF could channel the community’s anger into a single
resounding plea for reform.
Similar movements had taken on incidents of police brutality in other cities in the
1960s. In one example from North Richmond, California in 1967, police shot Denzil Dowell,
a Black teen, multiple times and fled the scene. Dowell’s body was discovered hours later by
his family, who sought help pursing his killers from the Black Panther Party for SelfDefense. Like the BBUF after instances of police brutality, the Panthers first attempted to
work with city officials to find justice for Dowell and his family, but finding none along that
path, and like the BBUF a few years later, the Panthers held rallies that attracted large crowds
in protest.83 Over the long-term too, the ideas that germinated in BBUF circles eventually
became mainstream in Boston. In another parallel example from New York City, activists
spent decades trying to establish an independent review board to investigate incidents of
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police brutality.84 In the end, the BBUF concluded that community members from outside the
BPD needed a say in matters of police misconduct. Many direct actions of the BBUF were
due to a lack of accountability from city and police leadership, but the group continually
pressed for formal oversight by Mayor Kevin White and the city government regardless.
The first, and most famous, police shooting that the BBUF became involved in
investigating, trialing, and redressing was that of Franklin Lynch. The attention given to
Lynch’s killing can be attributed not only to his regional celebrity, but also to the
senselessness of his death at the hands of a police officer. Lynch lived in Georgia and New
Jersey before coming to Boston to pursue a career in music. Once settled in the city, he
jumped headlong into the emerging soul music scene, and shortly before his death released
his first single, “Young Girl.”85 By many measures, Lynch was on his way to a successful
singing career, but tragically, he would be gunned down by Patrolman Walter Duggan at
Boston City Hospital before getting the chance to reach his full potential.
On March 7, 1970, Lynch was a patient at City Hospital due to a bout of odd behavior
over the preceding few days. The events that would quickly unfold that day attest to the fact
that something was wrong with Lynch’s mental state. The Boston Globe reported two days
after the shooting that what resulted in Lynch’s killing started as a fight between Lynch and
another patient, John Condon. After having broken up the fight one time, Duggan became
frustrated when it resumed. At that point, the patrolman pushed Condon down, breaking his
leg, and aimed his gun at Lynch. According to the Globe reporter, who was an eyewitness to
the shooting, five fatal shots came after Lynch snapped a towel at Duggan’s gun. The bullets
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not only tore through Lynch, but one hit another patient who happened to be the father of
another patrolman.86 The second victim died twelve days later.87 The brutal force with which
Duggan killed Lynch stirred outrage in Boston’s Black community and, in response, the
BBUF took up Lynch’s cause.
Suspicious of the ability of the police department and the court system to act
impartially in investigating the death of an unarmed Black man at the hands of a patrolman,
the BBUF began their own inquest on March 25. The organization put out a call to any
lawyers within their community who could serve as judges during the proceedings.88 The
result of the inquest was a charge of murder against Duggan. Meanwhile, the fears that
Lynch’s killer would not face justice were confirmed by Boston Municipal Court Judge
Elijah Adlow. The judge’s report “completely exonerated” Duggan and found that he was
justified in the shooting because the officer needed to impress upon Lynch the futility of his
actions.89 The obvious absurdity of killing someone to get a point across sparked disgust
among Boston’s African Americans and led the BBUF to convene a “Black People’s Court”
to try the patrolman.
“People’s courts” were not unique to the BBUF. In July 1967, following the killing of
three young Black men by police officers during the Detroit Rebellion at the Algiers Motel, a
tribunal was held to try the officers involved. The trial attracted over 2,000 attendees and
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international media coverage.90 In other instances, community trials took on issues other than
police killings. In December 1970, the Met Council, Black Panther Party, and Young Lords
put New York City’s mayor, housing officials, and bank executives on trial for the abysmal
conditions in minority neighborhoods.91 Trials like these were a manifestation of the
frustration with traditional institutions that activists felt during the Black Power era. In
Detroit in 1967 and Boston in 1970, mainstream courts had failed to find police officers
guilty of any wrongdoing even though the evidence strongly suggested otherwise. Likewise,
the New York City trial over housing drew attention to the failures of city government and
businesses to provide adequate housing for poor people. Although the murder trials were
spurred by specific events, like the housing tribunal, the belief in institutional failure had
been sown long before.
The outline of Duggan’s trial in the Black People’s Court shows a meticulously
crafted legal proceeding that relied on the BBUF’s “Black Laws” for its jurisprudence and
witness accounts as evidence.92 Obvious parallels with the mainstream American justice
system aside, Black People versus Walter Duggan was a radical reconceptualization of
criminal justice. Rather than relying on federal, state, or municipal outlets as the loci of the
judicial process, the BBUF brought it to the community level, the only place where they
believed they would find fairness. The fact that neither the defendant nor several of the
witnesses (Mayor White was called to testify) appeared shows the legal limits of the BBUF’s
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trial strategy; however, its emotional impact may have been the real point. According to an
internal BBUF evaluation of the trial, “people left with a sense of pride and progress.”93
The Black People’s Court found Duggan guilty of murder in the first degree in front
of an estimated 700 attendees. While there were some within the community who saw the
Black People’s Court as an exercise in futility, the BBUF believed they had exposed the
hypocrisy experienced by African Americans in the “white man’s court.”94 The high number
of attendees for a trial that would have no legally enforceable sentence shows the support that
the BBUF received among Boston’s Black community in their efforts and the vast frustration
that existed with police. The detail with which the trial was executed—having a presiding
judge, allowing witnesses to testify for the prosecution and defense, and providing closing
arguments95—attested to the community-wide desire for justice. By following the typical
proceedings of a “white” court, the Black People’s Court incisively modeled the impartiality
that they believed should be given to all, knowing that they themselves were not granted such
basic rights.
At the trial’s conclusion, Duggan was found guilty of murder. Having been
exonerated in the municipal court by Judge Adlow, however, Duggan was to remain on the
police force without consequence. The injustice of the white court’s decision and the lack of
power to hold Duggan accountable in the case of the Black People’s Court left the BBUF
limited options for seeking justice. So, as a community-based response, the group settled on a
“Poster Day”96 that would “out” Duggan for his crime. The posters included Duggan’s
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conviction as a murderer in the People’s Court, as well as his photograph and home
address.97
Two conflicting notions of justice arose from the BBUF’s actions in the case. One is
that they were protecting the African American community from a dangerous predator and
publishing his picture and address would keep the community wary. Another possible
purpose was that the BBUF was endorsing vigilante action against Duggan, although this was
denied by BBUF leader Chuck Turner.98 Perhaps both were true at once. In a twist of bitter
irony, at the end of his career, Duggan would become the assistant commander of the
Community Disorders Unit, the division of the BPD charged with investigating hate crimes.99
Lynch’s killing was not the last time the BBUF would investigate and challenge the
official narrative of a police-involved shooting of a Black man. In the two years following
Lynch’s murder, Raymond Grady, Derek Culbert, and Thomas Cornell would all be shot by
Boston police. Cornell was the only one of these three to die from his wounds, but the other
two suffered permanent physical and psychological trauma. While the BBUF investigated the
circumstances of each of these shootings, they would only hold a community-wide trial again
in Grady’s case.100 As for Culbert and Cornell, the BBUF sought justice through more
official channels than they did in the case of Lynch, surprisingly with some success. These
victories, however limited, may have been the reason that the leadership of the BBUF did not
go to the same lengths that they did in the Lynch case again.
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On May 22, 1971, Raymond Grady was shot by a Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority policeman. As in Lynch’s case, a fairly minor squabble escalated to a shooting and
took place in a setting—a crowded city bus—that begs one to question the reasoning of the
police officer involved. The major difference between Grady and Lynch’s cases was that the
former miraculously survived, although part of his brain was removed.101 The damage would
ultimately cause Grady to suffer a severe change in his personality and cognition. Deckle
McLean of the Boston Globe was skeptical of the officer’s reasons for inserting himself in a
conversation between Grady and another passenger, Joseph Jones, going so far as to write
that “in no version of this story would the events that produced the shooting have occurred
without the instigation of the transit policemen.”
McLean’s investigation found four plausible scenarios that led to Grady’s shooting.
The first posited that a fight started between Jones and a white man on the bus. From there,
the fight escalated, with two other men getting involved, one Black, and the other white.
During the uproar, the second white man, who was an undercover MBTA police officer, shot
Grady between the eyes. The second story of what led to the shooting came from the BPD. In
this account, Jones swore at a uniformed police officer and then physically assaulted him.
Grady joined in to help Jones, and then another white non-uniformed police officer stepped
in to help the first one. The third account of the events came from a man who was walking
down the street as the events unfolded and interviewed bus passengers afterward. According
to witnesses on the bus, Jones was joking around and was told to shut up by a white MBTA
policeman. The policeman then grabbed Jones and a fight ensued. Another pair of men, one
being Grady, the other a white man in plain clothes, stood up and became involved. The
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second white man then shot Grady. All witnesses agreed that neither Black man was armed.
The fourth and final account of the shooting came from the MBTA police. In this telling,
Grady and Jones started a fight with a policeman, and encouraged all of the bus passengers to
attack the police officers. Then, the uniformed officer fired a round into the roof to scare the
crowd. At this point, even though most of the passengers had fled, according to the MBTA
police, Jones went for the officer’s gun while Grady attacked the second, plainclothes officer
with a razor. The second officer then shot Grady in self-defense.102
The findings of the BBUF investigation would later confirm the first and third stories
that McLean heard. Witness testimony for the inquest included the driver of the bus, the
police, and Grady. According to the bus driver, an MBTA officer had shot a Black teenager
and a Black man on the bus, but it was so crowded he could not see what happened until it
was over. He did note that he saw the bullet hole in the first victim’s head and that parts of
his brain were scattered in the aisle. In a second account from police, a passenger had pulled
a gun on the bus driver and the MBTA officer had responded with force.103
Finally, in Grady’s account, the facts of the case match the Globe versions of the
story where the shooting started as a minor altercation. As he attested from his hospital bed,
the problem started when the MBTA officer told Jones to shut up and be quiet. Jones talked
back to the officer saying that he was not doing anything wrong. The officer perceived Jones
as being insolent and proceeded to grab him. Grady said that he intervened to help Jones
because Jones was not doing anything wrong. After that, the plainclothes officer appeared
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and started beating Grady over the head with his gun. Grady did not remember much after
that.104
Because the driver’s account so thoroughly differs from that of the police in this case,
the idea that someone held up the bus driver can be dismissed. Thus, the likely account is
some version that corresponds to the accounts of Grady, the bus driver, and other witnesses.
Although the findings of the BBUF shed light on the true events on that MBTA bus, the only
action taken was to ask the community to write or call MBTA police headquarters.105 Even
though justice for Grady proved elusive, the following police shooting would yield more
tangible results for the BBUF in their fight against police violence.
The next police shooting of a member of Boston’s Black community occurred less
than two months later. This time, Derek Culbert was “accidentally” shot on July 19, 1971
while inside the new Dudley Street Police Station #2 by Patrolman Anthony J. Giorgi. 106
Unlike in the murder of Lynch or the permanent crippling of Grady, however, the BBUF
would, surprisingly, find a modicum of justice for Culbert. Calling on the Afro-American
Patrolman’s League (AAPL) for support, BBUF leadership rallied Black police officers to
get Giorgi dismissed.107 The AAPL was founded in Chicago in 1968 after Officer Edward
“Buzz” Palmer was ordered to “shoot to kill” during the uprising following Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s assassination. Initially, the AAPL was led by Palmer and sought to align Black
police officers with the needs of their communities, but this stance proved too radical for
some and Palmer was eventually forced out. In 1972 the AAPL was merged into the National
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Black Police Association.108 The AAPL’s support furthered the BBUF’s case that police
violence against members of the Black community was recognized as a problem by some in
their own ranks.
On August 2, 1971, the police commissioner heard from Deputy Superintendent
Arthur C. Cadegan regarding complaints against Giorgi, charging him with violating the
rules and regulations of the BPD. Giorgi was found guilty and dismissed.109 In part, credit for
the successful removal of a violent police officer can be attributed to the pressure exerted by
the BBUF. In contrast to the previous two shootings, the BBUF worked within the existing
power structure, rather than the community, to get results. This demonstrates the flexibility
with which the BBUF was willing to act in order to improve conditions for African
Americans. The frequency of unarmed Black men being shot in seemingly innocuous
locations—the hospital, a bus, now a police station—by police may have also finally led the
city administration to give in to the Black community’s calls for justice.
Cornell Thomas was the fourth and final unarmed Black victim of a police shooting
for whom the BBUF would seek justice. The official narrative of events that led to Thomas’
death was told in several Boston newspapers. According to these accounts, on February 9,
1972, Thomas, a nineteen-year-old, was driving a Volkswagen bus the wrong way down a
one-way street. At the same time, Patrolman Richard Armstead was driving in the correct
direction and the two narrowly missed each other. Next, the officer opened the driver’s door
on the Volkswagen and asked Thomas for his license and registration. In the BPD’s telling,
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this is the point at which Thomas drove the bus toward Armstead. Fearing for his life, the
officer opened fire, hitting Thomas. He died the next day in the hospital of his wounds.110
The escalation from a seemingly banal encounter with a police officer to a shooting echoed
the Lynch, Grady, and Culbert cases. Just as in Grady’s case, Thomas was also accused of
attempting to harm a police officer and thus the BPD argued the violence was justified. In all
three of the previous police shootings the BBUF had become involved in, the perpetrating
officer was white. In the Thomas case, however, the police officer was African American,
further complicating ideas of who can commit acts of police brutality and murder.
Whatever the official news story and BPD accounts of the shooting of another
unarmed Black man, the BBUF was determined to gather their own facts as they had in the
past. In this case, there were three witnesses who were in the Volkswagen bus when Thomas
was shot. Their stories did not mesh with the mainstream narratives and would lead the
BBUF to again call for action from the city’s power structure. The three witnesses to
Thomas’ shooting, Jerry Kelley. Robert Corry, and Michael Brook, gave BBUF investigators
largely identical accounts of how the shooting transpired. Their story conflicted with the
official narrative in a few key aspects. First, none of the three said that Thomas drove his
Volkswagen bus at the officer. In fact, they claimed that Armstead had already gotten back in
his car. It was only after Thomas blocked Armstead from driving off in order to write down
his license plate that the officer came over to Thomas again. Second, all three witnesses
testified to a disturbing degree of harassment from Armstead. As they remembered it, the
officer was angry that Thomas was driving the wrong way down a one-way street and did not
immediately show his license and registration to the non-uniformed officer. After Thomas’
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refusal to comply, the witnesses stated that Armstead held a gun to Thomas’ head.
Furthermore, after shooting Thomas, Armstead ran to the other side of the van, and pulled
out Corry at gunpoint.111 The escalation of this minor traffic infraction into the killing of an
unarmed Black man is hard to fathom without attributing gross wrongdoing to the officer
involved.
Based on the facts uncovered in their own investigation, the BBUF employed both of
the strategies that they had used in the past to seek justice for Thomas. First, they went to the
community with the evidence they had gathered. The community concluded that there
needed to be an open inquest, that Armstead should be charged with murder, and that he
should be suspended from the police force for the duration of the proceedings. Beyond the
details specific to the Thomas case, the BBUF also demanded that Mayor White establish a
community review board to investigate police violence and to appoint a new police
commissioner who would be supportive of that effort.112
Mayor White’s response to the BBUF’s demands was less than enthusiastic. On the
matter of the investigation into the Thomas shooting, he replied that there was an ongoing
inquest at the time of the BBUF’s demands and that the officer had been relieved of duty
pending the results of said inquest. He disagreed, however, that any further action should be
taken at that point. As for as the larger issues of reform raised by the BBUF, the mayor was
strongly opposed to both a community review board or finding a new commissioner. His
resistance to a community review board arose from his belief that the head of an
organization, in this case the police department, should have full control over who is in his
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employ. The issue of removing the police commissioner was glossed over by stating that his
term had expired, but that he would be replaced when the mayor found someone else or he
retired.113 From this response, it is apparent that Boston’s “progressive” Mayor White was
not going to pursue meaningful change in the face of Thomas’ killing.
The successes of the BBUF between 1970 and 1972 in getting justice for police
killings were paired with bitter disappointments. Only Grady’s shooting garnered any
favorable action from the city power structure. For the others, protests by the BBUF over the
shootings were met with hostility or, at best, indifference by the courts, BPD, and City Hall.
Rather, most of the BBUF’s success in getting justice for the victims of police violence came
from within the Black community. In particular, Lynch’s case, and the protest that followed
it, found strong support among Boston’s African Americans. It was in that instance that the
BBUF was best able to muster the power of the community to form institutional alternatives
to unjust white ones. At the same time, the publicity of the trial, conviction, and poster
campaign against Officer Duggan raised awareness among the general public that injustices
continued to be perpetrated against Black citizens by the police. The BBUF’s demands for
police reform continue to reverberate into the present day with former Mayor Marty Walsh
planning to create a civilian review board of police misconduct.114
The shooting of Thomas, in particular, demonstrates the complications of solving
racialized policing by simply hiring more Black officers. In Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s,
Black officers were hired under the assumption that they would bring their experiences as
Black Americans to policing and thus reduce the historic white supremacy rampant in the
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police force. Evidence suggests, however, that sometimes even Black police officers thought
that the solution to the problems plaguing their own communities was violence.115 This same
problem emerged in the case of the BPD when Armstead killed Thomas over a minor traffic
dispute. Although the BBUF took actions on this killing as well as three others, their holistic
approach to the carceral state was a result of the recognition of the limitations of reforms like
hiring more Black BPD officers. There was an entire power structure working against
Boston’s Black community and other avenues were pursued to chip away at it piece-bypiece.
Black Judges
Shortly after the acquittal of Officer Duggan in the killing of Lynch, the BBUF would
turn their attention to the matter of Black judges in the Massachusetts court system. This was
not simply a matter of greater representation for the BBUF; it was a matter of life and justice.
Like the BBUF, the BPP also doubted the ability of African Americans to receive fair trials
in the court system. The difference between the two groups, though, was that the BBUF
attempted to create changes through the power structure while the BPP directly challenged it.
In 1968, BPP members rallied in Oakland to protest Huey Newton’s imprisonment for the
killing of a police officer.116 Later, in 1970, protests against Bobby Seale’s murder trial
directly challenged the legitimacy of the charges against him in the first place.117
The BBUF’s methods were less confrontational than those of the BPP, but more
systemically focused. Nonetheless, both challenged the legitimacy of a court system that
excluded members of their community from positions that exercised power over Black lives.
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Both cases also demonstrated the need to build Black political power, a goal that appeared
more realistic in Boston as the black population rapidly grew in the 1960s.
In an appeal to the governor of Massachusetts penned by BBUF leaders, State
Representative Royal Bolling and City Councilor Tom Atkins, the United States Constitution
was put forth as foundational to their belief that “a man should be judged by his peers.”
Continuing, they wrote that the only way to achieve justice in the courts was to have judges
who are “sensitive to and understanding of those whom they judge.”118 The message was
clear and supported by elected officials from the community: Black people should be judged
by Black judges.
The Lynch case drove this point home for the letter’s authors, but also for all the
people who supported Duggan’s conviction in the “Black People’s Court” and hung his
“wanted” poster outside their homes and businesses. How could a police officer who shot
and killed an unarmed Black man in a hospital (and who also accidentally killed another
patient) face no legal consequences and retain his job? Viewing the entirety of the criminal
justice system as rotten, the BBUF demanded not only change and oversight of the police
department, but within the courts as well. This appeal received mainstream media coverage
due to its support among prominent Black Bostonians.
The request that the governor appoint Black judges received immediate notice in the
Boston Globe. On December 11, 1970, the newspaper noted that the BBUF was particularly
interested in seeing the appointment of Black judges to a vacancy in Boston Municipal Court
and to a chief clerkship in Dorchester District Court. As quoted in the article, Atkins and
Bolling, coauthors of the letter written to the governor, disagreed over the chances of getting
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Black judges appointed to these positions. Atkins thought that the governor would be
receptive to their request and understood the urgent need for reform. Bolling, on the other
hand, was not optimistic, and had heard that a deal had already been made to appoint a “nonBlack” person to the open clerkship. 119 This divide was reflective of the divide within the
BBUF. Its leaders felt the need to continually press for reforms within the local and state
justice systems, but also understood that racial biases and historical power imbalances were
systemically stacked against them.
According to BBUF leadership, statistics proved that the Massachusetts court system
reflected the biases that they associated with white judges overseeing cases involving Black
people. Out of a total of 260 judges in the Commonwealth, only three were Black.120 These
three judges were only slightly more than one percent of the total, and were not
representative of Massachusetts’s African American population. In the estimation of the
BBUF, were minorities to be properly represented in the judiciary, their number would
comprise closer to ten percent of all judges.121 Furthermore, BBUF leadership protested the
beginnings of mass incarceration which, according to them, followed from this disparity.
BBUF leaders wrote to Governor Sargent that among the prison population, a growing
number included African Americans far beyond their percentage in the general population.122
Black citizens were becoming more entangled with the carceral state, and data supported that
contention. In their estimation, one piece of the puzzle for finding justice would involve
putting their peers in judgeships in order to give Black defendants a shot at impartiality.
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Boston’s Black community, as in much of the action taken to address police
shootings, was the foundation of support for the BBUF in the matter of judicial reform. A
petition campaign was launched in order to show citizen support for “being judged by [one’s]
peers.” These petitions were then sent to Governor Sargent to show the community’s support
for the appointment of more Black and minority judges.123 Accompanying the petition was
the argument from the BBUF that there were plenty of qualified African American lawyers
who could be appointed to these positions.124 However, neither community support nor a
qualified pool of candidates could persuade the governor to give the BBUF what they
wanted. Throughout the early 1970s, journalists in the Boston Globe would continue to argue
that Black judges made up a woefully inadequate percentage of the Massachusetts bench.125
In the area of judicial reform, the BBUF were ahead of their time. The white power
structure in Massachusetts was much slower to embrace the idea of the judiciary as a
reflection of the population, at least as far as that sentiment was extended to the state’s
African Americans. However, the recognition that the Black community was increasingly at
the mercy of the criminal justice system was on the minds of BBUF leaders well before it
was studied in depth and identified as part of the carceral state. It is in this sense that the
BBUF’s activities with respect judicial reform can be considered successful. They were
unable to change the makeup of Massachusetts’ courts through community-based actions, but
in the realm of ideas they planted the seeds of changes advocated by future activists.
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Prison Reform
Like the activism that followed police shootings of unarmed Black men in Boston, the
BBUF’s Black Community Prison Committee pursued immediate, measurable goals while
always keeping in mind the wider ranging societal changes that were their ultimate purpose.
Conscious of the importance of both to the community, the committee released a statement of
purpose, writing that:
In working for prison “reform” it is important to recognize that “reform” is
only a temporary measure. The cries all of the country for “reform” must
not be allowed to confuse our real goal, that is, the destruction of the entire
institution that permits wanton and unmitigated assault on human decency.
Our efforts for “reform” are justified by the reality of a long and ardous
[sic] struggle for destruction of the prison system. We must somehow make
our concern meaningful to those who will not live to see our goal achieved.
It is clear that our goal to free our brothers and sisters from the prisons is
synonymous with the struggle to free ourselves from the claws of this
decadent giant of a country.126
Embracing this ethos in the early 1970s, the BBUF worked to change conditions in prison as
well as for those who would soon finish their sentences. The Charles Street Jail, Deer Island
Prison, and Norfolk Prison were the three correctional institutions where they focused their
efforts.
Other African American activist groups of the same era recognized the connections
between urban poverty, the imprisonment of Black Americans, and the carceral state as well.
Most famously, the BPP placed prison abolition in their 1966 Ten Point Program.127
Prominent BPP members like Huey Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, Emory Douglas and others all
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had personal brushes with the carceral system as youths and then again as adult activists.128
On the receiving end of the United States’ shift from federal responsibility for welfare to the
states, Black communities and activists became concerned by the increasing incarceration of
Black men. From the perspective of those most likely to be imprisoned, it was not difficult to
see the role that prisons played as inner cities sought to deal with poverty by imprisoning the
most vulnerable. The BBUF similarly concerned themselves with this piece of the carceral
state and had the inspiration of the BPP from a few years prior to help guide them to their
ultimate aim of prison abolition.
The Charles Street Jail was the first piece of the Boston prison complex that the
BBUF saw as ripe for reform. Built in 1848, by the early 1970s conditions in the jail were so
deplorable that two commissions had called for its complete demolition and two others had
called it inhumane. Nonetheless, the jail continued to hold approximately 300 prisoners
awaiting trial.129 Attempting to improve conditions at the jail, the BBUF appealed to Suffolk
County Sheriff Thomas Eisenstadt, the person in charge of the facility, but with little success.
In an April 30, 1970 letter to Eisenstadt, the Prison Committee thanked him for his assistance
with creating rules and regulations for inmates and personnel, something that had not
previously existed at Charles Street, but lamented his unwillingness to meet with them to
continue the work.130
In a terse response on May 1, 1970, Eisenstadt offered to arrange a meeting between
the committee and Master Edward V. Handwerk, an official at the jail.131 The committee did
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meet with Handwerk on May 14, but had expected Eisenstadt to attend as well. The sheriff
never showed up. Adding to the insult was the fact that Handwerk first denied knowing about
the rules and regulations submitted by the committee. Later, upon reflection, Handwerk
recalled the proposal, but said he knew nothing of its status within the sheriff’s office.132 This
was the end of the BBUF’s first attempt at prison reform. While unsuccessful, this
experience, as well as the one with Deer Island Prison, would inform the group’s tactics as
they continued to work on other prison reform efforts.
Deer Island, a peninsula in Massachusetts Bay not far from Boston, served as a prison
from Massachusetts’ colonial era until its demolition in 1991. In the twentieth century, the
prison was known to be rat-infested and dirty. One member of the demolition team went so
far as to equate conditions in the prison to those in a dungeon. Nonetheless, almost 1,000
prisoners were living there at the time of the renovations.133 When the BBUF fought for
reforms twenty years prior to this assessment, the conditions were the same. In fact, for Black
prisoners, Deer Island was not only terrible physically, but run by a racist administration that
deprived them of their rights.
On July 23, 1970, prisoners at Deer Island began a hunger strike to protest degrading
physical and psychological conditions. According to Robert Jackson, then an inmate at the
prison, they were peacefully protesting for better food, medical care, family visitation rights,
and an end to the racism and exploitation exhibited by the prison administration. Urging the
BBUF to form a committee to assist incarcerated African Americans, Jackson was looking
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for an outside group that could advocate for their interests.134 Later that September, the group
would meet with Dexter Eure of the Boston Globe, who urged the committee to expand their
focus to all prisons, not just the one on Deer Island.135 The committee would go on to work
on issues at Norfolk Prison and with soon to be released prisoners, but first they focused on
Deer Island.
The actions that the BBUF Prison Committee took with respect to Deer Island
continued the method they employed with the Charles Street Jail. Namely, appealing to the
leadership of the prison’s administration. In the case of Deer Island, the BBUF again worked
with Boston City Councilman Atkins, later a leader with the NAACP, to write an appeal to
Commissioner Joseph McBrine of the Penal Institutions Department of the City of Boston.
Atkins focused on the lack of jobs granted to Black prisoners during their incarceration, the
racism of those in charge of the prison, abysmal sanitary conditions, and lack of adequate
food. Strikingly, he noted, the accusation of racism had to be taken seriously because an
estimated eighty-percent of the prison’s inmates were Black.136 There is no evidence that
Deer Island changed its practices due to internal pressure from the prisoners or from the
BBUF’s external efforts, but it would inform the group’s change in strategy at Norfolk and
lead to their most successful effort at prison reform.
The conditions at Norfolk were not much different than the Charles Street Jail or Deer
Island Prison. Inmates listed a diverse array of complaints regarding censorship, rule of law,
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food, visitation, discipline, civil rights, education, work, medical care, and recreation.137
Likely due to the failures they experienced in trying to work with the administrators of
Charles Street and Deer Island, the BBUF employed a different tactic when working on
reforms at Norfolk. This time, the Prison Committee worked directly with the Act
Committee, a group formed by Norfolk inmates. At the June 23, 1971 meeting of the Prison
Committee, the group agreed unanimously to work as an arm of the Act Committee to
facilitate action in the community and communication on prison reform.138 After a year of
trying to work through official channels, the BBUF was fed up with the absence of progress.
This change in tactics acknowledged the BBUF’s failure to work through official
channels, but it presented a new path forward to find justice in the Massachusetts prison
system. Seven months prior to the June 23 Prison Committee meeting, the BBUF started the
Pre-Release Assistance Program. In a candid assessment of the program, the BBUF
acknowledged a great deal of frustration, but listed successes in employment and housing for
those recently released from Norfolk. Suggestions for building on these successes included
supplying the recently incarcerated with behavioral services, hiring more Black and
“Spanish” prison personnel, hiring more Black parole officers, allowing inmates to have job
interviews prior to release, and, for those who would soon be paroled, allowing them outside
of the prison during the day.139
After two failed attempts at reform, the BBUF turned to the area where they had the
power to act: Boston’s Black community. If they could not get prison administrations to
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budge, they decided to work with prisoners at Norfolk through the Act Committee and give
them hope once they were paroled. It is significant that the suggestions the Committee made
to continue to improve inmates’ conditions were once again aimed at reforming Norfolk at
the institutional level, rather than at the level of individual prisoners. This indicates that
members of the Prison Committee understood the realities of the power dynamics they were
facing, but continued to believe larger changes could be instituted at prisons in furtherance of
the ultimate goal of prison abolition.
The Community Security Agency
Unlike police shootings, judicial appointments, or prisons, BBUF efforts on security
were focused entirely inward. Other BBUF reforms often tried to change institutions that
affected the Black community—or at least gain concessions from them—but with the
formation of the Community Security Agency (CSA), the BBUF took policing into their own
hands. Community patrols were not unique to the BBUF, however, with discussions of street
patrols occurring in California at least as early as 1966. Most famously, Huey Newton’s
Black Panther Party (BPP) fielded armed patrolmen, but their primary purpose was to stop
police violence. In contrast, the CSA’s purpose was to prevent street crime. Newton was also
critical of earlier community patrols, specifically those in Watts, because they attempted to
work with the police to some extent.140 The CSA, unlike the more militant BPP, made limited
attempts to work with the BPD and therefore their efforts were more akin to the efforts in
Watts than the insurgent model presented by the BPP.
What the CSA lacked in formal legal recognition it made up for in support from
Black businesses, non-profits, and citizens. The Urban League, Roxbury Multi-Service
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Center, Roxbury Action Program, and Tenants’ Association of Boston were among the
organizational members of the CSA whose representatives were interested in preventing
“Black People committing crime against Black People.”141 Safety was paramount in these
efforts, but there was also explicit recognition by BBUF leadership that there could be no
economic growth within the Black community if crime was allowed to continue unabated.142
In this way, the CSA brought together the radical and moderate wings of their coalition by
combining community-based policing and the protection of Black businesses. The CSA not
only put security patrols on the streets of Boston, but also gathered data on crime in the Black
community.
The robbery of Unity Bank in December 1970, along with the murders of two
security guards at Freedom Foods on August 14, 1971, were the catalysts that brought the
CSA to fruition, but the problem of crime had been on community member’s minds for quite
some time.143 Seventy-two people from the Black community were surveyed by the CSA and
the results showed a community ravaged by crime and lacking trust in the police department.
Twenty-five percent of the respondents’ houses had been robbed. At the same time, over
forty percent of respondents did not think that calling white police officers would do any
good. Finally, over ninety-four percent of those surveyed said that they would support a
Black police force within the community—effectively endorsing the creation of the CSA.144
To protect themselves, CSA members sat down with Black Boston police officers to
learn the extent to which they could operate while not running afoul of the law. Topics
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discussed at the August 10, 1971 meeting included how the officers could best serve the
community and the differences between community and personal property rights.145 In this
case, the BBUF attempted to liaise with the BPD, but limited their focus to Black officers
only. This was consistent with the findings of the survey that found vast amounts of distrust
with white police officers among Boston’s African Americans. It would be another six
months until Cornell Thomas was shot by a Black Boston police officer, even eroding the
Black community’s trust in Black officers. The police shootings prior to Thomas’ had
already divided the community from the BPD, but, in those cases, the offending officer had
been white. When Thomas was shot by a Black officer, the notion that more representation in
the BPD would lead to systemic change was challenged.
Beginning in 1970 and continuing into 1971, CSA patrols walked the streets of
Jamaica Plain, Dudley, Columbia Point, and the South End, noting the racial make-up of the
neighborhood and assessing security needs. According to some of these reports, it appears
other community security services were already operating to some extent and that the CSA
patrols acted as a liaison between them and the BBUF.146 This role was in keeping with the
role of the BBUF as an “umbrella” organization that brought community members and
groups together to act with common purpose. Fielding their own patrols, however,
demonstrated their commitment to direct action as well.
When it comes to security, success is hard to measure. The CSA’s patrols may have
prevented crime, but there is rarely evidence of a crime that someone did not commit.
Therefore, the BBUF’s security efforts alone cannot be considered either a resounding
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success or an abject failure. Rather, they must be viewed in the larger context of all the
criminal justice reforms that the BBUF undertook at the time. They were but one tool that the
BBUF sought to use in their arsenal to find justice in a system that offered very little to Black
people. While the CSA was operating, there was a large degree of support from Boston’s
Black community, so much so that business owners, concerned citizens, politicians, and
activists all contributed to it.147
When contrasted with Fortner’s “Silent Majority,” the history of the CSA paints a
drastically different picture of the Black community’s stance on crime—at least in Boston—
and the way that community members envisioned stopping it. In Fortner’s telling, the
carceral state grew from Black Americans’ victimhood at the hands of criminals in their
communities. Then, after experiencing rising crime in inner cities, it was African Americans
who wanted more punitive measures and hence the rise of the carceral state.148 The history of
the CSA shows that Black Bostonians were concerned with crime in their neighborhood.
However, the narrative departs from Fortner’s analysis after that point.
The BBUF and the residents of Roxbury, Mattapan, Dorchester, and the South End
did not look to the state for a solution. Instead, they looked to their community’s ability to
organize and operationalize security measures. When combined with the BBUF’s stance on
prisons, it is apparent that not all Black communities favored the punitive approach that
would continue to grow in coming decades, but that some actively worked against it.
Moreover, it raises the question of whether a true majority actually wanted the punitive
solutions that were handed down by the state. In the case of Boston, the answer was a
resounding no.
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Police shootings, courts, prisons, and crime occupied the BBUF during their most
active years in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Unlike prior activist groups in Boston, the
BBUF was not focused on changing one aspect of a system they viewed as unjust. Instead,
the BBUF focused on immediate issues like police violence against unarmed Black men and
street crime as well as institutional sources of injustice like courts and prisons. Thus, their
vision of reform and fairness on matters of crime was systemic. They were fighting
immediate and long-term problems, but the goal was always a more just, and ultimately nonexistent, carceral state. At the same time, BBUF leadership understood what was possible
and sought to accomplish what they could while looking toward the future.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Capital flight, urban renewal, and migration drove the carceral turn in Massachusetts
and Boston in the middle of the twentieth century. Combined with the long-standing racism
of police, judges, prison wardens, and others in positions of power, Boston’s African
Americans, like urban Black communities nationwide, were over-policed and underprotected. This dual effect was not well understood by scholars and activists outside the
community at the time. It seems contradictory that Boston’s Black population would have
been unsafe when encounters with the carceral state were increasing, but because those
encounters were often violent in the case of individual officers or unfair in the case of courts
and prisons, distrust and fear developed. As crime rose within Boston’s Black community the
BPD and the criminal justice system were viewed as a threat rather than a solution.
Within this context, the history of the BBUF’s criminal justice activities offers new
perspectives. For one, it shows that, for a time, Boston’s Black community was
simultaneously concerned with Massachusetts’ carceral apparatus and the street crime that
was plaguing their community. Most scholarship has focused on the institutions or social
forces that led to the brutal policing and imprisonment of millions today. This has left out
almost any accounting of what Black communities across the country did to try to stem the
overwhelming tide of money and resources that were going into the carceral approach to
managing society. Of course, Fortner does focus on the Black community, but largely to
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show that the majority of Black Americans—at least in Harlem—favored the “tough on
crime” approach that quickly became today’s carceral state.149 As the history of the BBUF
establishes, this is not the whole picture. The BBUF’s example shows that their vision laid
the groundwork for a form of justice that paired safety with freedom from state oppression.
Another historical aspect of the BBUF that has been overlooked is community
cohesion. From rallies against police violence to community patrols, the BBUF was able to
engage community members across class and ideological lines. Much of the groundwork
began in the early 1960s protest movements, but the BBUF channeled that energy toward
criminal justice like no one had before. The unity that the BBUF was able to achieve over a
sustained period reveals a shared understanding throughout the Black community that
something needed to be done about the carceral apparatus and crime. Debates occurred
within community meetings and committees about what exactly the operational aspects of
this change would be, but there was widespread agreement about what needed to change.
A third important aspect of the BBUF’s history is the confluence of economics and
racism. While there is a debate in the literature over which drove the growth of the carceral
state more, the history of the BBUF continues the conversation about how they are
connected. Boston’s Black community was disproportionately affected by shifts in capital,
construction, and demographics because of the long legacy of racism. In 1960s and 1970s
Boston, a feedback loop between economic dislocation and racism occurred. Those who were
most racially marginalized became the most economically marginalized. Economic
vulnerability led to dislocation, which caused further fraying of the social fabric, and people
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turned to crime out of desperation. The carceral state was then the white power structure’s
solution to the problems of poverty and racism as the Keynesian era waned.
Fourth, the BBUF’s use of media like posters, newspapers, newsletters, and word of
mouth to spread news of injustice within the community and to organize resistance strategy
prefigured the social media organizing and doxxing of today. Publishing Walter Duggan’s
photograph, name, and address on posters after Franklin Lynch’s murder was an especially
bold move that finds direct parallels with Black Lives Matter. The BBUF may have been
trying to protect their community by warning people about dangerous officers, but they also
may have been insinuating that someone should take justice into their own hands. Much like
protesters who “out” white supremacists and violent police officers today, the BBUF were
outing racist cops in the analog age.150 There is a fine line between vigilance and vigilantism
that all protesters must straddle. Some may believe they went too far in Duggan’s case, but at
the heart of the matter was that the BBUF understood that change rarely occurs when those
who are oppressed remain silent. Using the tools available, they made their community’s
anger felt in such a way that both Black and white Bostonians could no longer ignore
problems of criminal justice.
A fifth important aspect of the BBUF’s history of combatting the carceral state was
their willingness to work both within relevant institutions and outside of them. To address
police shootings of unarmed Black men, judgeships, and prisons, the BBUF tried to negotiate
changes with the mayor, wardens, the governor, and other people in positions of power, often
writing letters or requesting meetings. At the same time, however, the BBUF were realistic
about the limits to which the white power structure would accommodate the Black
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community’s demands for justice. After the police shootings in the early 1970s, the BBUF
was willing to investigate, litigate, sentence, and protest what they and many in the Black
community saw as grave injustices. Likewise, in the case of prisons, the BBUF worked
directly with inmates to try to spur change. The CSA was an entirely community-driven
enterprise that protected African American sections of Boston in lieu of police support. The
dichotomous nature of action by the BBUF showed a strong sense of realism when
confronting the carceral state and demonstrates that long-term changes required a
multipronged approach.
A final element of the BBUF’s approach that remains significant is their
understanding of the systemic nature of the carceral state. This understanding extended not
only to the interconnected elements of policing, the judiciary, prisons, and crime, but also to
economics, politics, and quality of life. Leaders on the Security Committee made the
connection between stopping robberies and killings and the ability of small businesses to
thrive. The Pre-Release Assistance Program was another example of the link between the
carceral state, prosperity, and, ultimately, freedom. The BBUF in the late 1960s and early
1970s understood these connections and the need to address them systematically because
they and their community lived them on a daily basis.
At the same time, the history of the BBUF demonstrates the limits of a communitybased approach to systemic social problems. The BBUF regularly turned to Boston’s Black
community for support because they were rebuffed by the white power structure. In the longterm, however, this approach failed to stop police violence, mass incarceration, or street
crime. It offered an alternative community-based model to the carceral state, but could only
have been sustainable with support from federal and state governments. Without that support,
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the problems of poverty were met with an increasing reliance on violent policing and
increasing imprisonment, while crime continued unabated.
Even though the carceral state continued to grow after the BBUF’s demise, the
accomplishments of the group continued to bear fruit over the long-term. In 2004, Lenny
Durant, a former BBUF leader, provided the Roxbury Community College Library Special
Collections with an assessment of their original Twenty-One Demands, finding that in some
form or fashion almost all had been achieved. Addressing demand three, that all police
stations in the Black community should be overseen by Black captains, Durant writes that the
two precincts in Black districts of Boston had achieved that goal.151 This shows that the
BBUF were ahead of their time in their assessment of the carceral state as a growing
problem. By making these demands, considered radical by the white power structure and
even the NAACP, the BBUF planted seeds that over time became accepted as reasonable
solutions to the carceral state. The slow, piecemeal achievement of many of the goals of the
Twenty-One Demands has not changed Boston the way the BBUF envisioned, nor has it
oriented Boston away from carceral solutions. Nonetheless, the legacy of their achievements
has opened up spaces and conversations for new activism and organizing.
The connections between contemporary activism around criminal and racial justice
and the BBUF are clear. They are united across time in their opposition to the carceral state.
What is different today is that many urban leaders are less equivocal in their support for
police, judicial, and prison reform. Mayors in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Boston
have all expressed solidarity with the goals of the BLM movement to a degree unheard of in

“Historical Note,” Collection Overview, Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, Roxbury Community
College Library Special Collections.
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the late 1960s or 1970s.152 Some of this difference can be attributed to the greater diversity in
city constituencies and leadership. Another part of increased scrutiny of the carceral state can
be attributed to its sheer size. A final part can be attributed to groups that fought the carceral
state early on. The BPP is the most famous example of resistance to police oppression, but
the rich history of the BBUF’s activities show that it too is part of the legacy that has brought
criminal justice reform into the American consciousness. As a significant part of Boston’s
history, the BBUF’s legacy calls for a greater understanding among scholars and the general
public. Their history is a crucial link that connects the civil rights and Black Power eras in
Boston and reverberates in today’s ongoing protests against the carceral state.

Ivan Pereira, “Bill de Blasio paints Black Lives Matter mural outside Trump Tower,” ABC News, July 9,
2020, https://abcnews.go.com/US/bill-de-blasio-plaints-Black-lives-matter-street/story?id=71690137; Tom
Schuba and Mitch Dudek, “Black Lives Matter to Lightfoot: Unrest won’t end until ‘the safety and well-being
of our communities is finally prioritized,’” Chicago Sun-Times, August 10, 2020,
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/8/10/21362612/Black-lives-matter-lori-lightfoot-police-shootingenglewood-looting; AJ Willingham, “Washington, DC paints a giant ‘Black Lives Matter’ message on the road
to the White House,” CNN, June 5, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/us/Black-lives-matter-dc-streetwhite-house-trnd/index.html; Quincy Walters, “Walsh Declares Racism a ‘Public Health Crisis,’ Proposes to
Divert Less Than 3% Of Police Budget to Other Services,” WBUR News, June 12, 2020,
https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/06/12/boston-racism-public-health-crisis.
152

96

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources
“Agenda for Black Solidarity Day Against Racism and Repression.” Boston, MA:
Boston Black United Front, May 19, 1970. SC1, Box 1. Roxbury Community
College Library Special Collections.
African American Police League. March 28, 2008 on Archive.org.
https://web.archive.org/web/20130802071400/http://aapoliceleague.org/index.
html.
Anglin, Robert J. “Globe reporter witnessed hospital shooting.” Boston Globe, March
9, 1970, SC1, Box 13, Folder 8, Roxbury Community College Library Special
Collections.
Atkins, Thomas I. “Letter to Commissioner Joseph V. McBrine.” August 13, 1970.
SC1, Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
“BBUF Versions of Raymond Grady Shooting.” n.d. SC1, Box 13, Folder 5, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
“Black district judges, clerks called for.” Boston Globe, December 11, 1970. SC1,
Box 13, Folder 4, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
“Black Laws.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, November 2, 1969. SC1,
Box 1. Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
“Black People vs. Walter Duggan: Order of Trial.” SC1, Box 13, Folder 9, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
“Black People’s Inquest into the Death of Franklin Lynch.” United Front Justice
Committee, Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, March 19, 1970. SC1,
Box 13, Folder 8, Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
Boston, Leroy. “Poster Day Letter.” May, 6, 1970. SC1, Box 13, Folder 9, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.

97

“Boston mayor backs creation of new police oversight office.” Associated Press
News, October 13, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/marty-walsh-bostonpolice-police-reform-ec9d2bb804446a972dfa9d1ef8cfee3e.
“Boston Police Shoot 18 Yr. Old Brother.” n.d. SC1, Box 13, Folder 5, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
“The Community Security Agency.” n.d. SC1, Box 4, Folder 2, Roxbury Community
College Special Collections.
Curwood, Stephen. “Murder of Franklin Lynch.” Boston After Dark, May 26, 1970.
SC1, Box 13, Folder 8, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
Di Iorio, Bob. “Policeman Shot Fatal to Roxbury Youth, 19.” Boston HeraldTraveler, February 11, 1972. SC1, Box 14, Folder 7, Roxbury Community
College Special Collections.
Dilday, James. "Appoint Black Judge." Boston Globe, Feb 21, 1973.
“’Dungeon' Set for Razing; Deer Island Prison Will Give Way to Sewage Plant: [ALL
Edition].” Telegram & Gazette, Dec 29, 1991.
Eisenstadt, Thomas S. “Letter to Mr. Williams.” May 1, 1970. SC1, Box 2, Folder 2,
Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
Friedman, Elliot and Janet Riddell. “White, United Front Discuss ‘Principles’.”
Boston Globe, April 12, 1968, 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The
Boston Globe.
“Goals of the Boston Black United Front.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front,
June 9, 1970. SC1, Box 1. Roxbury Community College Library Special
Collections.
Goode, Mark A. “Meeting with Mr. Dexter Eure – Boston Globe – September 28,
1970,” Prison Committee of the Black United Front, October 2, 1970, SC1,
Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
Grady, Raymond. “Account of Shooting on May 25, 1971.” n.d. SC1, Box 13, Folder
5, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
Hassan, Brother A. “Evaluation: in terms of short, medium, long range effects.” April
10, 1970. SC1, Box 13, Folder 9, Roxbury Community College Special
Collections.
“Historical Note.” Collection Overview. Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front,
Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
98

Jackson, Robert. “To Members of the B.U.F.” n.d., SC1, Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
Jordan, Robert. "A Chance to Name More Black Judges." Boston Globe, Oct 10,
1972.
Kelley, Jerry, Robert Corry and Michael Brook. “Witness Testimonies Regarding the
Shooting of Cornell Thomas.” February 11 & 14, 1972. SC1, Box 14, Folder
7, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
Khadijah, Sister. “Brother Shot on MBTA Bus!” n.d., SC1, Box 13, Folder 5,
Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
King, Mel. “Black Solidarity Day.” Franklin Park, Boston, MA: Boston Black United
Front, May 19, 1970. SC1, Box 1. Roxbury Community College Library
Special Collections.
Kuballah, Akbar. “Community Security Service Information Report.” The Boston
Black United Front, October 12-17, 1970, SC1, Box 4, Folder 2, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
“List of Inmates’ Complaints: Norfolk Prison.” n.d. SC1, Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
McLean, Deckle. “Four versions of a shooting story…they prove one thing.” Boston
Globe, June 29, 1971, SC1, Box 13, Folder 7, Roxbury Community College
Special Collections.
McNamara, Police Commissioner Edmund L. “Personnel Order No. 3184.” Bureau of
Administration, City of Boston Police Department, August 2, 1971, SC1, Box
13, Folder 5, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
“Minutes of the Justice Committee.” Meeting minutes. Boston, MA: Boston Black
United Front, April 3-May 4, 1970. SC1, Box 2. Roxbury Community College
Library Special Collections.
“Minutes of the Steering Committee.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front,
December 2, 1968-March 6, 1972. SC1, Box 2. Roxbury Community College
Library Special Collections.
Mukiya. “Communication & Security Committee Meeting.” Elite Restaurant, August
6, 1971, SC1, Box 4, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special
Collections.

99

“Nation Building Concept.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, n.d. SC1, Box
1. Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
“Organizational Membership.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, n.d. SC1,
Box 1. Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
“An Outline Proposal for the Establishment of a Community Crime Commission.”
Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, August 25, 1971. SC1, Box 1.
Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
Pereira, Ivan. “Bill de Blasio paints Black Lives Matter mural outside Trump Tower.”
ABC News. July 9, 2020. https://abcnews.go.com/US/bill-de-blasio-plaintsBlack-lives-matter-street/story?id=71690137.
“Political Platform.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, n.d. SC1, Box 1.
Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
“Pre-Release Assistance Program Assessment.” June 17, 1971. Boston Black United
Front, SC1, Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special
Collections.
“Press Release.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, February 23, 1972. SC1,
Box 14, Folder 7, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
“Prison Committee Meeting.” 107 Elm Hill Avenue, Boston, MA: Boston Black
United Front, June 23, 1971, 8 pm. SC1, Box 2, Folder 2. Roxbury
Community College Library Special Collections.
Rakowsky. Judy. "As Reported Hate Crimes in Boston Surge, Prosecutions Drop."
Boston Globe, June 12, 2000.
Schuba, Tom and Mitch Dudek. “Black Lives Matter to Lightfoot: Unrest won’t end
until ‘the safety and well-being of our communities is finally prioritized.’”
Chicago Sun-Times. August 10, 2020.
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/8/10/21362612/Black-lives-matter-lorilightfoot-police-shooting-englewood-looting.
“Statement of Commitment.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, n.d. SC1, Box
1. Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
“Statement of Demands.” Boston, MA: Boston Black United Front, n.d. SC1, Box 1.
Roxbury Community College Library Special Collections.
“Statement of Purpose.” Black Community Prison Committee, August 16, 1972. SC1,
Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special Collections.

100

“Summary Minutes.” Community Meeting on Crime. Shaw House, November 10,
1970. SC1, Box 4, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special
Collections.
“Survey of Seventy-Two People.” Community Security Service, Boston Black United
Front. n.d. SC1, Box 4, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special
Collections.
Taylor, F. J. "Charles Street Jail Trial Judge Spends Night there to See Conditions."
Boston Globe, June 2, 1972.
Thomas, Barry. "Black Judges Needed." Boston Globe, Jan 3, 1971.
Turner, Charles et. al. “Letter to His Excellency Francis Sargeant.” Boston Black
United Front, December 10, 1970. SC1, Box 13, Folder 4, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
Turner, Chuck in discussion with Carly Caroli. Boston, MA. March 2016.
Turner, Chuck, Leroy Boston and Leonard A. Durant. “Letter to the Afro-American
Patrolmen Association.” July 29, 1971. SC1, Box 13, Folder 5, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
“United Front’s 21 Demands to Business, Government.” Boston Globe, April 9, 1968,
16. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Boston Globe.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. “Census Tracts—Final
Report.” U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960. Boston, MA, 1961.
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1961/dec/population-andhousing-phc-1.html.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. “General Demographic Trends
for Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970: Massachusetts - Final Report.” 1970
Census of Population and Housing. June 1971.
https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/42189394n126ch8.pdf#[0,{%22name%22:%22FitH%22},796].
Varda, Agnès. Black Panthers. The Criterion Collection, 1968. Kanopy Streaming.
Walters, Quincy. “Walsh Declares Racism a ‘Public Health Crisis,’ Proposes to
Divert Less Than 3% Of Police Budget to Other Services.” WBUR News. June
12, 2020. https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/06/12/boston-racism-publichealth-crisis.

101

White, Mayor Kevin H. “Letter to the Boston Black United Front.” City of Boston,
Office of the Mayor, City Hall Boston, May 3, 1972. SC1, Box 14, Folder 7,
Roxbury Community College Special Collections.
“WILD Memo Regarding Black Judges.” n.d. SC1, Box 13, Folder 4, Roxbury
Community College Special Collections.
Williams, John T. “Charles Street Jail.” Prison Committee of the Black United Front,
April 30, 1970. SC1, Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special
Collections.
Williams, John T. “Charles Street Jail.” Prison Committee of the Black United Front,
May 14, 1970, SC1, Box 2, Folder 2, Roxbury Community College Special
Collections.
Willingham, AJ. “Washington, DC paints a giant ‘Black Lives Matter’ message on the road
to the White House.” CNN. June 5, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/us/Blacklives-matter-dc-street-white-house-trnd/index.html.
Secondary Sources
Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow. New York: The New Press, 2012.
Balto, Simon. Occupied Territory: Policing Black Chicago from Red Summer to
Black Power. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019.
Bloom. Joshua and Waldo E. Martin. Black Against Empire: The History and Politics
of the Black Panther Party. Oakland: University of California Press, 2016.
Bowles, Nellie. “How ‘Doxxing’ Became a Mainstream Tool in the Culture Wars.”
New York Times. August 30, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html.
Bundy, Tess. “‘Revolutions Happen through Young People!’: The Black Student
Movement in the Boston Public Schools, 1968-1971.” Journal of Urban
History 43, no. 2 (2017): 273–93.
Caroli, Carly and Eli “Paperboy” Reed. “The Police Shooting that Boston Forgot.”
Boston Magazine (2020), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/franklynch-death/.
Chambers, Lauren. “Unpacking the Boston Police Budget.” American Civil Liberties
Union Massachusetts. https://data.aclum.org/2020/06/05/unpacking-theboston-police-budget/.

102

Clegg, John and Adaner Usmani. “The Economic Origins of Mass Incarceration.”
Catalyst 3, no. 3 (Fall 2019). https://catalyst-journal.com/vol3/no3/theeconomic-origins-of-mass-incarceration.
Crockett, Karilyn. People Before Highways: Boston Activists, Urban Planners, and a
New Movement for City Making. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
2018.
Farmer, Ashley. "Working Toward Community Is Our Full-time Focus: Muriel
Snowden, Black Power, and the Freedom House, Roxbury, MA." The Black
Scholar: Umass Conference: Black Art & Power in Movement November 1820, 2010 41, no. 3 (2011): 17-25.
Ferguson, Karen. Top Down: The Ford Foundation, Black Power, and the
Reinvention of Racial Liberalism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2013.
Fischer, Anne Gray. “‘The Place is Gone!’: Policing Black Women to Redevelop
Downtown Boston.” Journal of Social History 53, no. 1 (2019): 7-26.
Formisano, Ronald. Boston Against Busing. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1991.
Fortner, Michael Javen. Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the
Politics of Punishment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2015.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in
Globalizing California. California: University of California Press, 2007.
Gold, Roberta. When Tenants Claimed the City: The Struggle for Citizenship in New
York City Housing. Baltimore: University of Illinois Press, 2014.
Hinton, Elizabeth. From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of
Mass Incarceration in America. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2016.
Hirsch, Arnold R. Making the Second Ghetto. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983.
“Incarceration Trends in Massachusetts.” Vera Institute of Justice, December 2019.
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trendsmassachusetts.pdf.
King, Mel. Chain of Change: Struggles for Black Community Development. Boston:
South End Press, 1981.
103

King, Jr., Martin Luther. “Martin Luther King, Jr., Writes about the Birth of the Black
Power Slogan.” In The Rhetoric of Black Power, edited by Robert L. Scott and
Wayne Brockriede, 25-64. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
McCartney, John T. Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African American Political
Thought. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
Murch, Donna Jean. Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the
Black Panther Party in Oakland, California. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2010.
Norton, Jack and David Stein. “Materializing Race: On Capitalism and Mass
Incarceration.” Spectre 1, no. 2 (Fall 2020). https://spectrejournal.com/issuesindex/.
O’Connor, Thomas H. Building a New Boston: Politics and Urban Renewal, 19501970. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1993.
Rickford, Russell. “Black Power as Educational Renaissance: The Harlem
Landscape.” In Educating Harlem: A Century of Schooling and Resistance in
a Black Community, edited by Ansley T. Erickson and Ernest Morrell, Ch. 9.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.
https://harlemeducationhistory.library.columbia.edu/book/chapters/09/.
Sawyer, Wendy and Peter Wagner. “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020.”
Prison Policy Initiative, Press Release, March 24, 2020.
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.
Schultz, Stanley K. “Breaking the Chains of Poverty: Public Education in Boston,
1800-1860.” In Cities in American History, edited by Kenneth T. Jackson and
Stanley K. Schultz, 306-12. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972.
Taylor, Clarence. Fight the Power: African Americans and the Long History of Police
Brutality in New York City. New York: NYU Press, 2019.
Theoharis, Jeanne et al. “The People’s Tribunal on the Algiers Motel Killings.” Rosa
Parks’ Biography: A Resource for Teaching Rosa Parks, The Center for the
Humanities, Graduate Center, CUNY, 2021.
https://rosaparksbiography.org/bio/the-peoples-tribunal-on-the-algiers-motelkillings/.
Ture, Kwame and Charles V. Hamilton. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation.
New York: Vintage Books, 1992.

104

Vrabel, Jim. A People’s History of the New Boston. Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2014.
Wade, Richard C. “Violence in the Cities: A Historical View.” In Cities in American
History, edited by Kenneth T. Jackson and Stanley K. Schultz, 475-91. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972.

105

